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ABSTRACT

The shooting death of Michael Brown in June of 2014 by police in Ferguson, Missouri triggered
massive public protests across the United States, calling attention to a wave of similar incidents
thereafter, where unarmed black men have been killed at the hands of officers in a wide range of
locales. The recent coverage has revealed the extent and dispersion of aggressive and, in many
cases, fatal interactions between law enforcement and the public, particularly minorities. Actions
by the Department of Justice and other state and local agencies have consistently focused on
individual agencies and/or agents, as the cause of the problem. This research looks at the history
of crime control policy and the law enforcement mandate, from the 1960s onward, examining
disparities in crime policy and incidence. The findings show that the shift from locale-based to
centralized crime control and the manipulation of crime as a political construct has led to a
change in law enforcement identity, away from public service. Consequently, the governing
politics and organizational culture of law enforcement has institutionalized some of the most
reprehensible aspects, systematizing misconduct. The findings suggest that resolving the problem
of misconduct in law enforcement requires an identity shift, focusing on structural rather than
individual concerns and implementing more robust and comprehensive training parameters.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

In the summer of 2014, the shooting death of Michael Brown, a young African-American
man in Ferguson, Missouri, by the police, touched off a national conversation about law
enforcement behavior, particularly in relation to minorities. The uproar was significant and
widespread, not unlike that which occurred in the aftermath of the Rodney King beating in Los
Angeles, in 19911. That incident, similarly, inspired a national debate about police misconduct,
discrimination, accountability, and the racial nature of crime control with. Dissimilarly, however,
the shooting of Michael Brown was followed by numerous such incidents, of similar notoriety,
across the nation in diverse localities by a multitude of law enforcement agencies, suggesting
something more than a few problem officers, departments, or locales (Cato Institute 2015;
Collins 1998). Such widespread coverage is the result of ordinary citizens, using now ubiquitous
cell phone cameras, to record their encounters – and that of others – with police (Bock 2016).
Greater public access to communication platforms, where such documentation of police
misconduct can be widely disseminated, has led to unprecedented exposure. This fact suggests
that law enforcement misconduct is not necessarily increasing; however, its existence is
becoming more widely known through the growth of citizen journalism (Greer and McLaughlin
2010; Bock 2016; Brown 2015).
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Rodney King, a 25-year old African-American, was stopped by police following an alleged car chase. While
attempting to apprehend him, Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) officers were videotaped by a local resident
brutally beating King, as their colleagues looked on. The case led to the scrutiny of the LAPD as a department for
systemic abuse and misconduct. For additional details, see Mydans (1991).

While the national debate has, deservedly, focused attention on individual agencies,
officers and even specific policies, extensive research on law enforcement structure and
legislative initiatives for the past 50 years suggests that this episodic and individual focus
deliberates a limited aspect of a more complex and far reaching problem (Beckett 1997; Beckett
and Sasson 2004; Kraska 2001; Lee 2007; Rising 2010; Scheingold 1984; Simon 2009). Beckett
and Sasson (2004) and Simon (2009), in particular, provide a wealth of data on the political
construction of crime and the development of crime policy. They compare actual crime incidence
and public opinion data to shifts in crime policy, demonstrating how crime, as a policy area,
became a symbolic tool of the state. Their central thesis is that the crime issue has been
politicized – used as a governing strategy; a political tactic to further the power and control of
the state well beyond the actual threat of crime in society and public perception thereof. While
their research is invaluable to this paper, they stop short of scrutinizing the impact of this policy
on the evolution of law enforcement, structurally and tactically. This research seeks to determine
the validity of the notion that the state benefits from the politicization of crime – the
manipulation of the crime threat – and therefore to what extent has that affected the evolution of
law enforcement’s central mandate. Through archival research, this paper evaluates changes in
police conduct and tactics determining their responsiveness to demonstrable societal needs, such
as crime rates and adversary categories, across the continental United States. It further argues,
that problems within law enforcement agencies and officers are secondary to, and a result of,
system level policies and practices developed through organizational identity and culture.
Over the past five decades, politicians and policymakers have sought to define
criminality in very pointed terms, sounding the alarm on crime and criminal conduct; from
2

individual acts such as sex offenses, to more concerted efforts like terrorism2 (Beckett and
Sasson 2004). These public displays of political indignation have often translated into serious
proposals, legislation, and ultimately implementation in the form of laws and public policy. This
exact process has been replicated in each of the previous five decades, going back to the 1960s.
At the top of the political leadership, undoubtedly, is the President, who in addition to being the
nation’s chief executive, is also his party’s leader and the most resounding voice in the
administration of national policy. While policy is disseminated through the political system at
many levels, and those policies are not necessarily congruous across every locale, state and local
politics tend to be responsive to overarching executive policy directives and narratives (Boushey
2015). Being extensively documented, tracked and published, the President’s rhetoric is a helpful
bellwether for the policies and politics of the nation and gauging it here provides a lot of insight.
President Lyndon Johnson, in 1966 addressed the “war on crime” to Congress, stating that it
would “be waged by our children and our children’s children,” pledging “a unified attack”
(Woolley and Peters 2015). In 1972, President Richard Nixon proclaimed on the Republican
convention floor: “We have launched an all-out offensive against crime, against narcotics,
against permissiveness in our country” (Woolley and Peters 2015). President Ronald Reagan too
used his September, 1982 radio address to declare that America was “liv[ing] in the midst of a
crime epidemic,” warning that “every moment wasted is a moment lost in the war against crime”
(Woolley and Peters 2015).

2

Though domestic terrorism and, to an extent, international terrorism were issues of consistent concern to law
enforcement; a sea change in law enforcement efforts, attention, and coordination with regards to terrorism took
place as a result of the terrorist attack in New York of September 11 th, 2001 (Waxman 2009). In the years following,
terrorism became a central organizing principle for law enforcement activity and response.
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President George H.W. Bush continued Reagan’s line of rhetoric, predicating a $1.2
billion increase in federal spending on crime control in 1992 with a pledge that “Winning the war
on drugs means waging war on crime” (Woolley and Peters 2015). In an outline of policy
priorities to Congress, President Bush also pushed to “...escalate the war against drugs. The war
must be waged on all fronts. Our new drug czar, Bill Bennett, and I will be shoulder to shoulder
in the executive branch leading the charge” (Woolley and Peters). President Bill Clinton used his
second State of the Union Address, in 1994, to proclaim: “Every day the national peace is
shattered by crime,” adding, “Violent crime and the fear it provokes are crippling our society,
limiting personal freedom, and fraying the ties that bind us” (Woolley and Peters 2015). In fact,
except for his first in 1993, crime played a central role in each of President Clinton’s State of the
Union addresses. President George W. Bush confirmed much of his predecessor’s criminal
justice related policies, focusing his rhetoric on the victimization aspect and protecting victims of
crime (Woolley and Peters 2015). While announcing the Project Safe Neighborhoods initiative,
President Bush added: “In America today, a teenager is more likely to die from a gunshot than
from all natural causes of death combined... And for all our children's sake, this Nation must
reclaim our neighborhoods and our streets” (Woolley and Peters 2015). While President Barack
Obama has made an effort to disemploy charged rhetoric on the topic, taking the opportunity of
his first State of the Union address to call for “criminal justice reform,” and creating a Task
Force on policing, his administration has largely played catch up in the crime control area of
policy (Teague 2009).
In each of these past instances, policymakers defined the problem of crime as an urgent
calamity necessitating government’s undivided attention and resources; this, in defiance of the
4

1Source: FBI, Crime in the United States 2014 [report], printed in James (2015)

ebb and flow of the crime rate and its steady decline over nearly two decades (See Figure 1). A
highly combative, adversarial narrative of ‘war,’ toughness, and strict punitive policies has been
employed with vigor, throughout these examples. Conversely, research and commissioned
studies that have challenged the success and blanket application of the punitive approach to
resolving crime, advocating for rehabilitative and integrative policies instead, have been largely
ignored from a policy standpoint, during the same period (Flamm 2005; Murakawa 2008).
Despite differences in the approach of each of these administrations, the underlying
rhetoric has stayed relatively consistent. Boushey (2015) cites the centrality of problem
definition in the “diffusion” of policy, noting that policy emerges as a result of political effort to
define an issue in particular terms, amenable to the desired legislative result. Boushey (2015)
5

provides that policy can gain incredible political velocity when synchronized with spheres of
public concern. Scheingold (1984) demonstrates a little later in this chapter that fear of crime
looms in the public’s psyche, readily available to be tapped into. Flamm (2005), Kamisar (2000),
and Weaver (2007) observe that crime policy became strongly politicized in the early 1960’s and
beyond as a means of solidifying a transforming electorate, particularly for Republicans in the
South, and as redirection to emerging public power during the Vietnam War and Civil Rights
protests. The proverbial “crime problem” has thus been scapegoated for political purposes;
furthering larger political agendas, smearing political opponents, or redirecting public attention,
among others.
Inextricably linked to crime policy are the means with which it may be implemented: law
enforcement. Mirroring the political transformation of crime, law enforcement entities on a
number of levels (local, state, and federal) have undergone multiple and significant
transformations to their tactics, field behaviors, and assigned powers (Eterno 2007; Kraska 2007;
Maguire 2003a). These changes did not always supplement police with additional power;
however, they most often were undergirded by a politically disfigured narrative of crime.
Therefore, the resulting transformations have led to tactics and behaviors that ranged from faulty
science (See ‘Broken Windows’ Meares 2015), to criminal conduct (See J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI:
Churchill and Wall 1990; Underhill 2008). Of course, law enforcement has borne the brunt of the
blame, being the sharp end of the state’s enforcement stick. Individual officers, and ‘problem
departments’, have captured government attention following public incidents, such as in the
Rodney King case referenced above where the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) entered
into a ‘consent decree’ with the Department of Justice (DOJ), the first of its kind at the time
6

(Rushin 2014). A consent decree arrangement, where a police department subordinates oversight
of its operations to the DOJ, is based on documented, continuous abuses that violate federally
protected rights (such as an individual’s civil rights).
While departments may elect to enter into such an oversight arrangement with the DOJ,
most do so under threat of civil suit by the federal government (Rushin 2014). Multiple police
departments have since come under such a decree, with the most recent being the Cleveland
Police Department in Ohio following another high-profile police shooting, that of 12-year old
Tamir Rice in November of 2014 (Izadi and Holley 2014). In such cases, corrective action is
focused on negligence of policy on the part of the department, and negligence of practice on the
part of the offending officer(s), maintaining a narrow scope on individual-level cases. This, of
course, runs counter to one of the central assumptions of this research; that problem
officers/departments, are a predictable by-product of a problem system which, left unchecked,
will continue to regenerate itself in the same form.
A critical part of that system is the law enforcement institution itself, and its
organizational, tactical, and strategic development in the context of evolving crime policy. What
becomes of the institution and how its organizational identity is formed and then transformed via
internal and external factors, will be integral to this research. When attempting to define critical
areas of focus, some questions arise: What responsibilities do law enforcement carry? How do
they execute those responsibilities? Who does law enforcement answer to? What is the police
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mandate? How does the institution respond to changes in the state3 or in society? What metrics
are being evaluated and how do those metrics support or influence the identity of the institution?
To what extent is police responsive to political agendas and public policy? This is not meant to
be an exhaustive list, but these questions begin to address the evolution of the law enforcement
institution and provide junctures to evaluate where there might be divergences. The question of
who does the institution answer to is of particular interest, as there exists a number of sources of
authority depending on how the institution sees itself. As a service organization, law
enforcement answers to the public; as an enforcement arm of the state, law enforcement answers
to the executive in the relevant locale; and, as a professional organization, law enforcement
answers to its institutional leadership. These are not mutually exclusive, of course, however, the
ultimate source of authority holds the greatest influence on the identity of the organization and
what trajectories it might pursue to further its institutional goals (Maguire 2003b). An evaluation
of the law enforcement persona and a case study, in chapters three and four, might help elucidate
some of these questions.
What the politicization of crime thesis seeks to do is extricate law enforcement as an
implement from the policies and politics that lend it power, so that the former can be objectively
evaluated and sources of influence on the organization can be identified. Defining law
enforcement’s central mandate will be critical to recognizing how and where changes occur
within this space. Manning (1999), drawing upon a significant body of research, provides one
such framework, breaking down the law enforcement mandate to a range of activities with

3

The state as polity, defined as an organized political entity with a single, coherent governing structure, refers to the
central government of the United States. Unless named or stated, “state” in this paper does not refer to the
geographical and political subordinate i.e. the state of Tennessee.
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broadly defined areas of primary distinction. From this framework, I extrapolate the duties of
police, broadly, in three parts: 1) maintaining order; 2) enforcing the law, and; 3) peacekeeping.
Maintaining order, as opposed to anarchy and chaos, is primarily a function of the
communicative dimension of law enforcement, more broadly defined as community relations.
Enforcing the law is a means of establishing the power of the state, which is a function of the
force dimension; demonstrating the capacity of the state to exercise its will and ensure
compliance. Peacekeeping, or securing the health and safety of the public, is a function of the
public service dimension of law enforcement, largely disencumbered from law related activity,
as an assistive function. These dimensions are not mutually exclusive, intersecting and
overlapping in a number of areas, reinforcing one another. Policies are then created within the
purview of these duties and powers shaping the applied portion of the law enforcement mandate.
This research will evaluate performance based on the successful execution of police duties, as
defined above.
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CHAPTER 2: THE POLITICAL CONSTRUCTION OF CRIME

Crime itself could not come into being without the existence of laws designating some
acts as criminal while others not; so, crime at some level has always had a legislative if not
political appearance. However, not until the second half of the twentieth century did crime take
on a particularly political undertone. While this shift has been well documented in much of the
research, the underlying causes and its consequences for law enforcement have been less
scrutinized. This chapter examines the evolution of crime policy as a political issue and its initial
emergence as a response to social, political, and electoral upheaval beginning in the 1950s.
Previously, crime policy was near-exclusively a state and local concern and responses to crime
had been maintained at that governmental level. Some efforts to centralize crime control had
existed earlier championed particularly by FBI director J. Edgar Hoover (Gage 2013), but were
sporadic and not well managed. From the 1950s onward, however, the political construction of
crime began to drive a much more centralized, federal role in the development, implementation,
and oversight of crime policy to the extent that the federal government became the focal point for
crime remediation. The specific conditions that shaped the corresponding relationship between
criminal behavior and political motivation, during that time, were fraught with racial overtones
and party politics. With that foundation, the narrative of crime evolved to accommodate an
increasingly exclusive distinction of individuals, less-desired by the prevailing political order.
These changes were not limited to narratives alone, but application in the case of law
enforcement. While the state maintains the power to enforce its laws and policies, questions
regarding the constitutionality of that power in light of the development and purpose of policy
10

have arisen. This chapter examines the place of law enforcement in response to crime and the
power of crime as an organizing political principle.
2.1 The Politicization of Crime and Federalization
The American political, social, and economic landscape was in transformation following
the end of World War II and the economic boom that energized an expanding middle class.
Racial and cultural tensions rose significantly, with the demographic changes brought on by
black veterans returning from the war and resettling in new cities as well as a rapidly growing
suburban America (Murakawa 2008). Americans were turning their attention to areas of concern
within their borders; issues of social justice and political transformation. The U.S. Supreme
Court, reflecting changing public sentiment, was at the forefront with a series of daring decisions
that tore down the decades long precedent of separate but equal4, sought to end de jure
segregation, and recognized due process rights for criminal suspects. As Simon (2009) indicates,
it was in the beginning of the sixties, as the civil rights movement increased in strength and
scope, that lawmakers and politicians sought to change the narrative of crime to take on the
protest movements and civil rights advocates who had also become increasingly active,
politically. For Southern lawmakers in particular, this meant generalizing crime as categorically
related to particular ‘deviant’ groups – African Americans – rather than a consequence of
individual behavior (Lynch 2008; Simon 2009). This approach took on national proportions
during the Johnson administration when the anti-Vietnam War movement, which drove major
political demonstrations, opened the door for crime to leap from an individual or group

4

See Brown v. Board (1958).
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behavioral problem to being a matter of patriotism and national security, both highly political
distinctions (Beckett and Sasson 2004). By addressing public grievances with the government
through crime, political dissent could be better managed, weakening the underlying premise by
dismissing dissenters as criminals, deviants, and subversives (Churchill and Wall 1990). This
shift in the narrative of crime and the profile of the ‘criminal’ was instrumental in influencing
how criminal behavior would henceforth be managed.
Framing crime as a national security concern was highly consequential to the type of
power that could be brought to bear on the problem. Up until this point, crime remained
relatively confined to the authority of state and local jurisdictions. Federal interest in
manipulating the crime narrative, well framed by J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI, lacked the means or the
structure to effectively implement centralized enforcement in a systemic manner (Gest 2003).
That would change with the passing of the Omnibus Criminal Control and Safe Streets Act
(OCCA), signed by President Johnson in 1968 (Simon 2009). The legislation, expansive as it
was, included a number of civil rights oriented provisions, chief among them the creation of the
first criminal justice database for law enforcement (LEAA), which collated data for criminal
justice research focused on social aspects of the crime phenomenon (Bucerius and Tonry 2014).
However, the OCCA’s most marked contribution was shifting aspects of crime control to the
federal government, providing organization and structure that was increasingly centralized
(Simon 2009). This was accomplished mainly through millions of dollars in block grants to law
enforcement, giving the federal government increased influence and power within states and
even local jurisdictions on law enforcement activities (Simon 2009). Thereafter, the OCCA
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would continue to expand and numerous other legislation, of equal or greater consequence,
followed (Beckett 1997).
When considered within the historical context of the civil rights movement and the social
justice revolution of the 1960’s and 1970’s, the significance of centralization becomes clearer
still. American society was undergoing profound changes, confronting issues of segregation,
diversity, and individual rights. The public was becoming increasingly exposed to episodes of
police violence and the racial dichotomy of the tensions, mainly that of white perpetrators and
black victims (Surette 2006). Demands were made on the political system to address clear
injustices and take a more active role in redressing the grievances of the victims (mostly African
Americans). The conclusions that the public and the courts arrived at, however, were often at
odds with entrenched political interests within the federal and legislative branches (Kamisar
2000).
Where the public located the problem and what individual or institution they found
responsible was important to take control of. Key to explicating this framework is distinguishing
public perception related to crime during this early period, and thereafter. Compiling Gallup
opinion polling data from 1965 to 1980, Scheingold (1984) demonstrates that when presented
with open-ended surveys about the most important issue facing the country, Americans
consistently ranked other issues – not crime – as most pressing. With the exception of 1968-9,
and ’73, the rate of Americans ranking crime as a critical issue, was below 10 percentage points
(See Table 1).
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Table 1
Percentage (and rank order) of those responding “crime” of crime combined with such related
matters as “lawlessness,” “law enforcement,” “juvenile delinquency,” and “immorality.”
1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

29 (2)

17 (2)

5 (5)

7 (4)

10 (3)

17 (2)

4 (3)

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

5 (5)

8 (3)

15 (4)

3 (5)

8 (2)

2 (8)

1 Source: Scheingold (1984)

This indicates that, despite an increasing crime rate, the public was still relatively
unaffected by its consequences in any significant way. However, when asked using forcedchoice questions, crime consistently ranked highest for the same survey years in comparison to
other topics (See Table 2). Scheingold (1984) suggests that this statistical contrast is indicative
that crime in public perception is “latent rather than active,” pointing to a “powerful current of
suggestibility” (43-4). These findings are consistent with Beckett and Sasson’s (2007), who
demonstrate that public perception and fear of crime is “top-down” (120); initiated by political
agitation and media coverage, not the inverse. By comparison, respondents to open-ended
surveys for the same time period listed issues relating to civil rights, the Vietnam War, and
nuclear arms, as significant (Scheingold 1984).
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Table 2

Political Salience of crime: Forced-Choice Questions
1973

1974

1975 1976

1977

1978

1980

Halting the rising crime
rate
Dealing with drug
addiction
Improving / protecting
nation’s health
Improving / protecting
the environment
Improving nation’s
education system
Solving the problems
of big cities
Improving the
conditions of blacks
Welfare

64

67

65

65

65

64

69

65

60

55

58

55

55

59

61

64

62

60

56

55

55

61

62

53

55

47

52

48

49

50

49

50

48

52

53

48

50

47

42

40

39

40

32

31

27

27

25

24

24

20

22

23

13

12

13

13

The military, armament
and defense
Space exploration

11

17

17

24

24

27

56

7

8

7

9

10

8

18

Foreign aid

4

3

5

3

3

4

5

Source: Scheingold (1984)

Beckett and Sasson (2007) and Scheingold (1984) look more closely at another indicator
of public crime perception: fear of walking alone at night. Response trends in both data analyses
shows that, with the exception of a significant increase between 1972 and 1975, rates have
remained notably stable over time, declining over the past decade. This trend is in sharp contrast
with crime policy initiatives, which have steadily increased (Beckett and Sasson 2007).
Scheingold (1984) also shows that elevated negative responses to “fear of walking alone at
night” surveys, are better understood by breaking down the data to show the categories of
respondents most expressive of that sentiment, women and minorities in urban areas topping the
15

list. In each case, the existing “current of suggestibility” creates an opportunity to direct public
opinion in defiance of actual crime numbers, a fact that remains true today. Recent polling
demonstrates this divergence, where the public assumes that crime rates are rising, despite the
contrary (see Figure 2). This particular data set will later prove instrumental in understanding the
categories of crime that impact public perception strongest, and therefore are most effective in
capturing public attention.

Figure 2: Is there more crime in the U.S. than there was a year ago?
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

2001

More

2003
Less

2005

2007

2009

2011

2013

Same

2Source: Gallup Crime Perception Survey (Jones and Saad 2014)

The disparities in public concern over crime and political focus on the crime issue,
explicated above, were also reflected in civil rights era court decisions. The Warren Court, so
named after Chief Justice Earl Warren, ushered in what is commonly referred to as the “due
process revolution”, starting in 1961 with the Court’s landmark decision to disallow evidence
obtained through illegal search and seizure in Mapp v. Ohio (Kamisar 2000). The Court’s other
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landmark decisions in Miranda v. Arizona, Gideon v. Wainwright, Terry v. Ohio, and Beck v.
Ohio, among others, reinforced defendants’ constitutional rights and created better defined and
enforced rules of criminal procedure (Pye 1968). These decisions also had the effect of limiting
the near impunity law enforcement had grown accustomed to, violating defendants’ rights (Pye
1968). The impact and significance of the due process decisions by the court cannot be
overstated, inciting conservative condemnation on the undermining of law and justice to this day
(Rising 2010). Of course, these decisions were responsive to the social and civil rights
revolutions, noted above, that at once demanded and made such decisions possible. Quoting
McCloskey, Pye (1968) notes, “The Warren Court’s espousal of civil rights was less a matter of
deliberate choice than of a predictable response to the wave of history,” adding: “It may be
forcefully argued that the increased concern of the Supreme Court in matters of criminal justice
was almost inevitable” (256). The Warren Court’s most notable decisions had not overturned
precedent either, as some had suggested – many were, in fact, broader reiterations of decisions
made years prior – however, they provided sharp rebukes of violations of individual rights by
law enforcement within the broader context of the rights revolution (Pye 1968). To some
political interests at the time, that was a particularly acrimonious confluence.
Concurrently, the national crime rate was rising significantly. Over the course of the
decade, the national crime rate more than doubled, from nearly 3.4 million incidents in 1960 to
7.4 million in 1970 (Uniform Crime Reports, United States). A wealth of scholarship indicates
that the incredible social, economic, and foreign policy upheaval of the time, including the
Vietnam and Cold Wars, the civil unrest resulting from public dissent, and the recent
assassination of a very popular President, were at the root of this surge in criminal activity (See
17

National Research Council 2014; Ciment 2015; Rising 2010). There is also some credence to the
theory, put forth by Eterno (2007) that law enforcement lacked adequate coping strategies to
efficiently implement and transfer to the new legal requirements. Those deficiencies also may
have contributed to some degree of abandonment within the police force, impacting crime rate
negatively. However, conservative lawmakers were quick to associate it with the “handcuffing of
the police” by the liberal Warren Court, and the “coddling of criminals” (Rising 2010). Never
before did the mechanisms of the justice system, or academics and public figures, be so
pointedly and politically assailed and subjected to calls for reform and/or expulsion for their
stances on crime (National Research Council 2014).
Conservative and white segregationist anger against the Court, stemming from its antisegregation, anti-discrimination, and socially reformist decisions well before 1961, found a new
focal point for admonition: crime and law enforcement (Rising 2010). This particular event
signaled an important shift in public policy initiatives, from civil rights to criminal justice.
Nowhere was the shift more evident than in the 1964 presidential election, where Republican
senator Barry Goldwater challenged President Johnson’s “Great Society” initiatives with a “law
and order” platform that promised to “not support or invite any American to seek redress…
through lawlessness, violence, and hurt of his fellow man or damage of his property” (Beckett
and Sasson 2007, 50). Goldwater, as the National Research Council report finds, used “explicit
and implicit race-based denunciations of the civil rights movement” to gain white votes (2014,
108). Though crime was indeed rising at a significant rate, the statistical incongruities between
the public’s concern as relates to crime, and its prompted perception, noted by Scheingold
(1984), is indicative of the capacity to manipulate public response, versus natural emergence.
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In a clear demonstration of the public’s lack of “outrage” towards the crime issue,
Goldwater lost his bid spectacularly to Johnson, but crime had now become front and center in
the political arena, with conservative lawmakers eager to stoke it having lost both houses of
congress (Beckett and Sasson, 2007). Ted Gest (2001), who conducted interviews with over 100
officials and congressmen for his book Crime and Politics, quotes then DOJ crime research
chief, Gerald Caplan: “It was understood that the effect of Senator Goldwater’s lopsided defeat
was not to bury crime as an issue, but merely to transfer the official responsibility to the
democratic administration” (6). President Johnson soon coalesced, declaring a “war on crime”
less than a year later; creating the Office of Law Enforcement Assistance (OLEA), appointing a
national crime commission, and pushing through Congress the Law Enforcement Assistance Act
(LEAA), all of which radically federalized the administration of criminal justice and opened an
ever-increasing war chest of federal funds to state and local law enforcement (Beckett and
Sasson 2007; Simon 2009; Lee 2007). Despite the pressure, Johnson had attempted to take a
social science and research-based approach to the examination and remediation of the crime
problem, creating federal databases to track law enforcement action in addition to crime
incidence, and apportioning funding to rehabilitation programs and other social development
(Lee 2007).
The President’s Crime Commission had conducted lengthy research, surveys, and
interviews, involving thousands of participants and experts, in an attempt to produce a bipartisan
and comprehensive report (Gest 2001). The commission’s contribution to the development of
research, professionalization, and public understanding of the criminal justice process cannot be
understated; however, the incredible extent of the undertaking – over 200 recommendations in
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the final report – proved too big for its own good. The commission’s work was plagued with
political infighting and came into conflict with other parts of the federal system, most notably J.
Edgar Hoover’s FBI (Gest 2001). As a result, the most important and contributive parts of the
report, ultimately, went largely unnoticed. The migration of the crime issue across party lines
would have a lasting effect on the politics of criminal justice policy across administrations,
hindering or altogether muting voices that called for less emphasis on “get tough” policies (Lee
2007). The passage of the OCCA in 1968, meant to be the legislative product of the Commission
report, was a radical reversal from the Great Society underpinnings of those previous crime
related initiatives, directly undermining some of the Supreme Court’s most significant due
process decisions (Kamisar 2000). Now, the ‘war on crime’ fronted all sorts of political
finagling, from suppression of public dissent, to de jure discrimination and segregation, to score
settling with the judiciary (Rising 2010).
The crime narrative’s success in redirecting the civil rights campaign and transferring
greater control to the state over its subjects, in a particularly punitive sense, led to its eventual
evolution (Lerman and Weaver 2010). Despite the unprecedented expansion of the federal role in
law enforcement regulation, the scope of federal control was still limited, particularly as relates
to street crime. The main thrust of federal control remained through funding, where the
allocation of funds would be contingent on state and local cooperation and/or implementation of
federally recommended or provided standards. This barrier to further federal expansion in the
area of law enforcement led to the next great shift in the political construction of crime: the war
on drugs. Unlike violent crimes such as murder, rape, and robbery, drug offenses fell under
federal jurisdiction, providing much greater latitude to the federal government in the arena of
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crime control (Simon 2009). Shortly after the election of President Richard Nixon, the shift in
drug control policy as a focal point of the war on crime began to take shape.
By further increasing the political visibility of crime and linking it with drug abuse,
President Nixon managed to increase the drug enforcement budget more than ten-fold, from $65
million to $719 million, and the LEAA budget by over 500%, from $65 million to over $500
million (Beckett and Sasson (2007). These staggering expansions of the government’s law
enforcement reach were only possible through the powerful political drive of the crime narrative,
tapping into the public’s underlying concern about issues of personal security (Scheingold 1984).
President Nixon may have been more vocal and unabashed in brandishing crime and punishment,
however, his successors would continue to use it to similar effect in the decades to follow.
2.2 The Coercive Power of the State
Laws are essentially the codified rules and norms of society which dictate the parameters
of order and chaos, defining what is normal and thus what is also deviant; more broadly
constituting who belongs and who is outcast. When individuals deviate from the publicly and
socially accepted contention of order and normalcy they become criminals – having broken one
or more of those codified rules and norms. Society’s perception of rules and norms are not static
and change over time and space (Richerson, Mulder, and Vila 2001). What is considered deviant
at a certain point in history may change its distinction at a later time, and what may be labelled as
normal in a particular region or state, may be considered deviant in another, and vice-versa.
Therefore, laws also change in response because, as noted earlier, order and peace as the
objectives of the state are only possible by rejecting those presumed to be deviants – whatever
the current perception is. This dialectical construction of the relationship between law and
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criminality is fundamental to understanding the changes that occur in societal acceptance or
rejection of certain behavior and, later, the agents that promote and enforce it.
Though, in principle, the public define these differences, the instrumentality of creating
deviance belongs to the state and is a powerful, exclusionary political device (Michalowski
2000). Therefore, norms do not only arise from society’s construction of them, but are often
times provided to society by specific interests (Reiner 2010). When it is expedient to the state to
create new classifications of deviance, or even to abolish old ones, the public is enlisted to adopt
such new distinctions, thereby empowering the state to codify the newly recognized norms and
enforce them (Reiman 1984). Because of the enormous power contained in such a construction,
the potential for abuse is equally considerable.
Couched within the above framework of law rests the police power of the state – its
legitimate power to enforce the law and maintain order. It is also precisely through that language
that the role of the agents, charged with the execution of this mandate, is defined. Maintaining
order is primarily a peacekeeping mandate with enforcing law on the coercive end of the
spectrum (Cummings 1965; Manning 1999). It is clear from our previous discussion on normalcy
and deviance, as relates to the construction of crime, that deviance is the exception – the anomaly
that evokes coercive power to bring it within line. The rule, being order, therefore only entails
the police’s peacekeeping role, arguably the central role for any domestic, law enforcement
entity (Cummings 1965). Though police power extends to coercive force, such force is
presumably limited to the extent that it serves a specific, restricted purpose: to protect the
collective from the deviance of a few. The legitimacy of this force stops when the transgression
has ceased and/or where the extent of its power to sanction has been exhausted (Simon 2009).
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This is to say nothing of the degree of force used or, for that matter, the degree of transgression
that would elicit it. This too is constructed, always dependent on the context and the individual
towards which the force is directed. The specifics regarding reasonable use of force are beyond
the scope of this paper; however, the narratives of crime and criminality and law enforcement’s
mandate and organizational identity all exert significant power over how, when, and on whom is
force used and to what degree (See Beckett and Sasson 2003; Ghandnoosh 2014; Lynch 2008;
Murakawa 2005)5.
The police in much the same way, historically, operate in a local context as crime and
other issues of a social nature are contextually related to the communities within which they
occur. Different environments, resources, and populations require different responses to highly
individualized issues. Such dispersion of power, however, provides only limited access to the
centralized federal government to direct and execute a uniform, overarching scheme of control.
While changing the power position of the federal government would entail changing the entire
system – an undertaking too radical and significant – there are other ways to extend centralized
control over localized matters.
In 1851, Justice Lemuel Shaw of the Massachusetts State Supreme Court, writing for the
majority in the landmark case Commonwealth v. Alegro, ushered a new term into the legal
lexicon: “police power”. Defining it, Shaw writes that it is “the power vested in the legislature by
the constitution, to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws,
statutes and ordinance, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they

5

For a more detailed breakdown of organizational identity, see Chapter 3.1 and 3.2
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shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same”
(Horwitz 1995). Later, in Jacobson v. Massachusetts (1905), U.S. Supreme Court Justice John
Harlan would solidify that definition, clarifying that such a power: “must always yield in case of
conflict with the exercise by the General Government of any power it possesses under the
Constitution, or with any right which that instrument gives or secures” (Horwitz 1995). Insofar
as the objective of the state is to ensure the welfare of its citizens and expect their cooperation
and contribution, law enforcement, generally, has been mandated to carry out that power
(Bucerius and Tonry 2014). Thus, the police represent the coercive power of the state, and as
part of the executive branch (within each level of government) are inextricably linked to the state
as a political entity inasmuch as a social, geographic, and ethno-cultural one. The political will of
the democratic state, in theory, serves public interest, and even when that theory is loosely
adhered to, maintaining order and ensuring the welfare of the citizens are essential to the security
and power of the state (Bucerius and Tonry 2014). Therefore, the state enacts laws for the
aforementioned purpose, using its police power to uphold them.
Because, here too, the potential for abuse is considerable due to the potential of police
power, the language extending it has at once sought to subordinate and narrowly define it. In
both early definitions provided by the courts, above, police power was legitimated insofar as its
use was “wholesome and reasonable” for “the good and welfare” of the public, and constrained
where it contravened Constitutional principles or the legitimate interpretation of the same
(Freund 1976). Ernst Freund’s seminal work “The Police Power,” maintains that it is the court’s
obligation to “not accept as conclusive” the legislative perspective on the parameters of power,
“but inquire in every case whether there is a legitimate exercise of police power” (p. 334). In so
24

stating, Freund clarifies the strong link present between the making of the law and the executing
of it, suggesting that one is not to be entirely trusted to hold accountable the other. This
framework holds true for all levels of policing, as the functionality of executive power is the
same whether emanating from the executive branch of a municipality, a state, or the federal
government itself. The United States being a federalist system grants great latitude to individual
states in the governing of their own affairs, with a central government of limited powers.
It would be naïve to neglect mentioning the cronyism and local politics that characterized
a lot of police agencies pre-1960 (Bayley and Nixon 2010). City and county government officials
and local politicians would use police to redress political or personal grievances extrajudicially;
and favoritism, corruption, and procedural negligence were often regular features of law
enforcement. The abuse of police power within this context was not insignificant but contained,
highlighting personal relationships, in comparison to a systematized version with publicly drawn
narratives, on a national level. Independent of other motivations and consequences discussed
earlier, efforts to professionalize police were responsive to this conflict of interest between
serving a limited group of powerful individuals and serving public interest as exemplified by the
larger society. The professionalization shift resulted in a more organized and systematic law
enforcement apparatus, distanced (if only by a few degrees) from local political machinations,
and characterized by greater procedural consistency (Bayley and Nixon 2010). However, the
conditions, motivations, and political forces that propelled professionalization also impacted its
efficacy as a means of creating an effective service organization (Gest 2001; Maguire 2003b).
The federalized nature of the professional shift led to the emergence of a more efficient
instrument of state power, with control and enforcement as defining factors.
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Whereas professionalization should have pushed the police institution towards an
increasingly integrated role with other dimensions of public service, it became further distanced
from that peacekeeping nature and more entrenched as protector and advocate for state interests
(Kraska and Cubellis 1997). Similar to professional accreditation bodies such as the American
Medical Association (AMA) for doctors and the American Bar Association (ABA) for lawyers,
centralization could have been accomplished through a professional accreditation body for law
enforcement, like the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), that provide
disciplinary, professional oversight and standards rather than a political framework. The
government would equally have systems for evaluation, control, and licensure not unlike those
that exist for law and medicine; the department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the
state and federal bars. However, with the federal political system providing much of the support,
funding, and strategic leadership for law enforcement at local levels, the source of authority has
shifted agency away from police organizations, making them increasingly subordinate to
federalized police operations: the ‘war on crime’ or the ‘war on drugs’. Chapter four engages a
broader conversation on how deployments of such national initiatives in the case of law
enforcement is erroneous, especially for a country as diverse and environmentally variant as the
United States.
2.3 The Narrative of Crime
Eminent in the conversation on crime policy changes and implementation is the greater
narrative of crime within society; its agents and actors. As with most publicly accepted
narratives, the narrative of crime foregrounds all other events related to crime, shaping and
influencing the way the public responds to it, the government deals with it, and society
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acclimates to it. We already have discussed public receptivity and reactiveness to matters that
concern their personal security, emphasizing the high rate of suggestibility in such topics.
Through the deployment of powerful, persuasive narratives such as patriotism, national identity,
personal security, and chaos; political and media-based rhetoric succeeded to reshape the
narrative of crime for political expedience. Just as the various American Presidents, in the
examples above, use carefully chosen words to reinforce particular policy objectives, so do
others in society, serving to construct the societal narrative surrounding crime. Lynch (2008)
chronicles a fundamental shift in this narrative coinciding, naturally, with the shift in policy
starting in the early 1960’s and again in the 1980s, with the shift to the “war on drugs” narrative.
This shift, in the definition and image of the “typical criminal,” was also highly racialized,
reflecting the political upheaval of the time.
Lynch (2008) describes three distinct typefications of “the typical penal subject:” an, 1)
old penal subject; a 2) transitional penal subject; and, a 3) new penal subject (Lynch 2008, 90-4).
Accompanying these individual characterizations is an equal characterization of the system
needed to accomplish the goals of rehabilitation, containment, or eradication of the “penal
subject” in question. Lynch (2008) describes the “old penal subject,” pre-dating the 1960s,
characterized as “a reformable being,” someone “who needed to be known and understood,”
using Garland’s term “penal-welfarism” to describe the systemic ideology approaching the
criminal subject (90). These presumptions about the role of the criminal and the state served to
develop the institutions of the latter not as a permanent destination where individuals are
castaway, but an interventional stage that only in extremely rare cases would dispose of its
subjects. Lynch (2008) describes this relationship:
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Thus the criminal/penal subject merely deviated on one or more scales from an idealized norm,
rather than belonging in a quantitatively different category of being. And since the penal subject’s
offending behavior or deviant acts fell within a continuum of human behavior, this conception of
the penal subject held the potential for productive change and was generally viewed as worthy of
state efforts to impel that change (90-1).

Key to this assumption, in a systemic sense, was that crime was fundamentally a treatment
problem which required a level of expertise within the system, an expectation of reformation and
conditional improvement, and a need to address conditions external to the “criminal” (Lynch
2008). What proceeded that understanding was a sea change in the conception and representation
of the criminal, or “the penal subject”. While Lynch (2008) notes the competing theories
emerging regarding crime and the state’s role in intervention, borne out of the rehabilitative
policies and assumptions of the Johnson administration and his Crime Commission, she
highlights the ultimate success of the largely political narrative that categorically distinguished
the criminal from the average individual. Citing an earlier study by Beckett, Lynch (2008)
references the use of the “law and order” narrative to shift the public conceptualization of crime
and criminals: “This political tactic, then, helped shape a new construction of the penal subject as
one who… was a much more significant threat to the nation’s well-being than previously
conceived” (92). Even more essential was the racial shift that occurred in the portrayal of the
penal subject, which Lynch (2008) documents closely through research she conducted of
correctional advertising and communication over a fifty-year period. This racial shift occurs over
two phases, in the transitional period of the 1960s and 70s, first: “a more violent… more
irrational, and less redeemable African American convict” that joined the former (inevitably
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male) “weak but redeemable white inmate”, and later: “a wholly irredeemable ‘other,’ primarily
identified as African American, who is best incarcerated to protect society” (93).
Comparatively, the first subject, the white inmate, fit the treatment model: smaller than
his handlers, perhaps “sickly,” being led, and the second subject, the darker skinned inmate, fit
the threat model: “a bulky, muscled figure” with a “surly or menacing facial expression,”
attempting to break loose (Lynch 2008, 93). What is of particular import in this shift is that it is
reflective of the emerging political narrative of crime, the one discussed previously, of an
essential threat that needed to be “eradicated”, “crushed” or “suppressed” but never treated or
studied. This racially framed “irredeemability” allows also for the delegitimization of the
concerns and complaints of these individuals, and elevates their magnitude of threat. The
transitional period did not last very long as the latter image of the criminal became standardized
and shifted perhaps further, towards an even less relatable or redeemable ‘other’. Therefore, the
new penal subject was an evolved version of his transitional counterpart: “The imagined
prototypical offender in popular, political, and even justice policy circles tended to be the scariest
(although statistically rarest) type of criminal, who need not be understood or corrected but who
must at any cost be contained and disempowered” (Lynch 2008, 94).
This new conceptualization of ‘the criminal’ was thus more simplistic and less complex,
placing greater (if not all) onus on the individual and therefore an inherent fallacy in their being.
Though, correctional institutions still retained their distinction as being ‘correctional’ they acted
more like clearing houses and containment centers than places where one might actually expect
‘corrective’ measures. Eventually, this characterization of the criminal evolved further, drifting
far from its health and social beginnings to the “super predator” of the 1990s (National Research
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Council 2014). In the interim, the penal system was expanding rapidly, cementing its role as a
repository for “undesirables” that had no other means of redress, as the common narrative on
crime allowed criminals to grow more and more distant from ‘normal’ members of society and
therefore easily discounted and shunned as having “chosen” a path of self-destruction, rather
than being potential victims of a system that fails to create opportunities for recovery. Other
categories of individuals, who on occasion would find themselves the subject of political
vilification, such as immigrants and religious or ethnic minorities, would increasingly be dealt
with punitively in the same manner (Lynch 2008).
On an organizational level, the political conversation on crime that undergirded the above
shift in the portrayal of the common criminal was fueled by Southern policymakers threatened by
the prospect of integration, and the end of Jim Crow, during the civil rights era. Stoking White
fears from integration, local governments in the South published erroneous “crime reports” and
laid blame on social programs for harboring and even nurturing criminality (Lerman and Weaver
2013). The narrative of crime emerging from that political climate was one that consistently and
pointedly spoke of crime and justice in racial terms. As Murakawa (2005) observes: “southern
Democrats opposed civil rights legislation in criminological terms, arguing that forced racemixing breeds crime, that civil rights legislation rewards black lawbreaking, and that blacks are
responsible for street crime” (81).
Linking crime with race and shifting the conversation from social equality and
development to criminal justice and ‘law and order,’ resulted in a dilution of the civil rights
argument, making it possible for the criminal-as-enemy image take hold. “The language of
lawbreaking relied on and promoted a social vision of individual failure rooted in moral
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depravity” (Lerman and Weaver 2013, 55). This emerging narrative played on public fears over
personal safety, becoming a force of its own that was politically unwise to confront. Thus, more
liberal political forces who supported integration and social reforms, became subsumed by the
greater criminal justice narrative. The political power of these socially constructed narratives of
crime is clarified by Boushey (2016) who suggests that criminal justice policies are congruent
with “target population” typification, pressuring state and local governments to “respond” to the
crime issue with increasingly punitive “law and order” policies (210-12).
Another powerful piece of instrumentality in developing the common narrative of crime
and shaping public consciousness on the issue, is the media. Both through journalism (such as
news) and popular culture (such as film), the crime narrative has at once been created and
dramatized for optimal affect. The media has helped propel forward this new image of the
criminal, described above: menacing, rogue, irredeemable, and most importantly “other” – dark
skinned and racially, ethnically, or religiously different. Violent crime, being the most kind to
sensationalism, has firmly occupied the airwaves; the perpetrator, nearly always AfricanAmerican (Beckett and Sasson 2004). In fact, in addition to getting a larger share of coverage,
Beckett and Sasson (2004) found African-Americans were “depicted differently” than white
defendants, often as perpetrators of violent crime, pictured “in the physical custody of police”
and not named, using instead terms such as “suspect” or “perpetrator” (79). By contrast, the
victims of violent crime often are represented as white and female, in direct contradiction to
every statistical trend on violent crime in the United States, the overwhelming majority of who’s
victims are black and male (Beckett and Sasson 2004). Since this research, the criminal
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archetype may have broadened slightly to include other minorities, but has stayed true to its
implication of “others.”
A more recent study conducted in 2014 for “The Sentencing Project”, indicates that this
narrative persists despite increased awareness of its fallacy and consequences (Ghandnoosh
2014). The rhetorical power of these portrayals and terminology cannot, and should not be
underestimated. White fear of black crime is an essential political construct, borne out of the
throes of the segregationist American South and cultivated by the media. The “atypical”
reporting and representation of the perpetrators and victims of crime is “not a product of how
representative or novel a crime is” Ghandnoosh (2014) suggests, “but rather how well it can be
‘scripted using stereotypes grounded in White racism and White fear of Black crime’” (Lundman
2003 quoted in Ghandnoosh 2014, 23). This discursive stereotypical loop, self-substantiates by
presenting and subsequently reinforcing a particular narrative of crime. Beckett and Sasson
(2004) observe that the same narrative is extended into popular culture representations; in
movies, TV dramas, and reality-based programming, further cementing the latter.
Similar to the statistical trends of public opinion regarding crime, Beckett and Sasson
(2004) demonstrate an incongruence between coverage of crime and actual crime incidence
rates. For example, over a period of five-years, starting at the beginning of 1990 when crime
rates, particularly homicides and violent crime, had been falling by over ten percentage points,
“television and newspaper coverage of crime increased by more than 400%... [and] network
news coverage of murder… increased by 336%” (Beckett and Sasson 2004). Scholarship abound
about the “manufacturing” (Surette 2007) of crime “waves” and crime “surges.” Instead of
being rooted in reality, there exists a disjointing between crime incidence and reporting of it,
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thereby creating the presumption of a crisis, in the absence of it (at least on the significant scale,
assumed).
Beckett and Sasson (2004) go farther, beyond being a conduit for transmission of the
crime narrative; “Under some circumstances, media personnel may also play a direct-role in the
policy making process” (87). They cite early research by criminologist Mark Fishman who
chronicled one such “crime wave” of purported violence against the elderly, even though no
specific increases in crime against the elderly had actually occurred. Nevertheless, the media
campaign at the time resulted in “the creation of new law enforcement squads and tactics, the
reallocation of public and police resources, and the introduction of legislation aimed at protecting
the elderly” (Beckett and Sasson 2004, 87). It is no surprise that the public is receptive to such
sensational stories of crime – the anomalous and rare event – but it is the insidious power to
impact how members of society relate to one another that is rarely addressed in this context and
is deserving of attention.
Law enforcement itself is hardly immune to the popular narrative of crime. Officers and
agents are, after all, members of society exposed to the same narratives and the same information
as anyone else in the public. Though their specialization may afford them access to sources of
information not readily (if at all) available to the public, this information is not part of the
average officer’s repertoire, and even then requires analysis and interpretation to produce
meaningful conclusions (Maguire and Uchida 2000). As we will observe later in the following
chapter, some effort is put into re-aligning faulty assumptions in the training process – this is
particularly true of larger law enforcement agencies with police academies and substantial
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funding, a category to which a vast majority of law enforcement agencies do not belong –
however, the fundamental assumptions about crime and criminality remain the same.
Importing this crime narrative into law enforcement has significant consequences, not
simply on individual perceptions toward their communities of operation, but in making these
latent assumptions reality enacted in society. Increased scrutiny by law enforcement of specific
target populations, inevitably leads to reduced scrutiny of other areas and populations
(Michalowski 2000). In those areas of high scrutiny and contact with law enforcement, there is a
much higher likelihood of uncovering incidence, and the converse is true. Those who experience
low contact with law enforcement, are not represented in criminal populations by virtue of that
decreased scrutiny, therefore perpetuating the common narrative of certain populations being
more readily disposed to violence than others (Reiman 1984). In essence, the crime narrative has
become a self-fulfilling prophecy of national proportions.
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CHAPTER 3: THE LAW ENFORCEMENT IDENTITY

The shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, MO touched off the national conversation
on police misconduct that this research is partially responsive to. While the issue has moved well
beyond that, the story of Michael Brown’s death itself has gotten more ambiguous. The account
of the officer who shot Brown has gained some credence, suggesting that Brown may have
fought Wilson for his weapon (Cassel 2014). When Wilson shot Brown and whether Wilson
pursued Brown, gunning him down, or Brown charged Wilson may never be known. What is
undisputable is two people encountered one another, one armed and one not, and only one person
emerged from that encounter: the armed one. While not every story (thankfully) ends in the
tragedy that Michael Brown’s story ends with, for police it is a story that often begins this way.
The popular image of police paints them into a black and white dichotomy, where the police
officer straddles a fine line between hero and villain. Officers often find themselves in unsavory
predicaments, facing desperate individuals, called upon to stride forward when most others
would scurry away.
Unlike the quick and simple dichotomies, often created by the media, these
confrontations are rarely devoid of gray areas where the distinctions of good and bad are blurred;
to some a vaunted hero, to others a depraved villain. Police work, of course, is much more
complex and complicated than such a definition suggests, where officers carry a much more
complex set of responsibilities that go beyond the most basic interpretations of “enforcing” the
law. While highly polarizing dangerous situations are a central part of the law enforcement
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profession, they hardly make up the majority of officers’ work. John Eterno (2007), a 21-year
veteran of the New York Police Department, notes the disparities between perceptions and
reality in police work, detailing the time he must spend with new recruits helping them unlearn
what they have learned about what a police officer does: mundane traffic citations, patient
surveillance, and health and traffic emergencies, rather than chasing criminals, breaking down
doors, and capturing suspects (2-3).
Beckett and Sasson (2004) extract the public’s notion of the police officer in the roles of
“crime fighter” with emphasis on “fight”, and “hunter” where the police officer’s routine is a
consistent barrage of adrenaline-pumping, crime-crushing fury. These notions are only
reinforced by popular culture that stylize the narratives of police work into cartoonish characters
of the most extreme ends of the spectrum - the work of fighting crime is not as glamorous or
high-octane. While each encounter undoubtedly brings the possibility of danger, most do not end
up that way. As Hoffman (1971) notes “police non-criminally related public services…
[comprise] seventy-percent of recorded police activities” (171). Since that study, a greater range
of indexing has been developed to categorize police work more optimally, still showing similar
numbers (Maguire 2003a). Through the 1990’s and 2000’s, popular culture has embraced more
complex characters for law enforcement; however, the underlying theme of a punitive crimefighter remains pervasive. Coincidental to the three eras of crime policy, three distinct eras are
most notable in the evolution of the law enforcement persona.
Though changes in the organization of law enforcement began happening much earlier
(Manning 2003a) the civil rights movement era of the early 1960s and 1970s was a particularly
formative time for the law enforcement apparatus, as the country experienced a reckoning about
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citizens/society and the relationship between government and the public (Murakawa 2008). The
second critical period was the drug war that reached a level of organizational maturity in the mid
to late 1980s, peaking in the 1990s (Simon 2009). That evolution very pointedly shaped the law
enforcement organization into a more “combat” oriented apparatus, with an increasingly martial
persona (Kraska 2007). The third and final era is the post September 11th, 2001 law enforcement
organization; an increasingly integrated, federalized entity with embellishments on the existing
martial identity and its tenuous relationship with the public (Waxman 2009).
Just as the persona of the ‘typical’ criminal is developed through the stereotypical
typification of a repetitive, familiar character; law enforcement equally develops their own
persona through similar stereotypical framings. Building on the previous chapter’s discussion of
the evolution of the crime narrative and the political underpinnings of crime control, in this
chapter we will explore the narrative of police work, its characterization and the evolution of the
profession’s organizational identity and public mandate. Using that framework, we will explore
the tactical evolution of how changes in law enforcement’s identity have reflected on their
mandate and the applied portions of training and tactics. As was discussed earlier, I am using the
evaluative framework of a three-pronged categorical inventory of police responsibilities, loosely
based on Manning (1999): maintaining order, enforcing the law, and peacekeeping (See
Appendix A). As Kelling (1992) and Maguire (2003a; 2003b) observe, significant differences in
quantifying performance exist across agencies and locales, making tracking similarities difficult;
however, in this research, a broader inventory of actions, consistent across difference in
performance interpretation, were coded to evaluate shifts in performance using a consistent
measure.
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3.1 Developing Individual and Organizational persona
Efforts to “professionalize” the police have been ongoing for decades, starting long
before the civil rights movement of the early 1960s and President Lyndon Johnson’s Crime
Commission. Early efforts to catalog police responsibilities and create a system of measurement,
resulted in a precursor to the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) database of today, in the
1930s (Maguire and Uchida 2000). The impact of greater statistical attention in police work
resulted in police agencies that put greater emphasis on crime control activities, as those were the
easiest to categorize and provided the most potential for organizational identity (Maguire and
Uchida 2000; Paoline 2001). In contrast to the federalization shift of the late 1950s and early
1960s, these early organizational and professionalization efforts were orchestrated by semiautonomous police organizations, such as the newly formed International Association of Chiefs
of Police (IACP), who maintained the integrity of individual agency identity even as they
developed a framework for centralized standards (Maguire and Uchida 2000; Maguire and
Archbold 2001).
While the notion of professionalization has been advanced by most scholarly research
into policing and law enforcement application (Bayley and Nixon 2010), defining what it looks
like and how it applies to individual agencies has been less congruous. As Maguire (2003b)
observes, professionalization became synonymous with crime control and crime fighting,
emphasizing the law enforcement dimension of police work above others. Absent more
comprehensive research, crime control inventory items became the performance bar for most
police agencies (See Figure 3). This was an important step in defining police culture moving
forward and they remain the most salient performance markers for police activity, to this day. As
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the performance metrics focused agencies on the law enforcement aspect, naturally attention
shifted away from maintaining order (as a relational metric) and peacekeeping, neglecting the
adaptation and evolution of those aspects.
Figure 3
Organizational
Performance
Measures

Crime
Rates

Arrests

Citations

Clearances

Response
Times

3 Source: Adapted from Maguire (2003b)

Just as the law enforcement apparatus was maturing into this definitional space as
autonomous agencies, the nation was undergoing a reorganization of the political order. The civil
rights movement had begun to mature and take shape more publicly, and along with it the
official narrative of crime control, animated by the sociopolitical upheaval that marked the 1960s
and 1970s. Law enforcement were front and center in the race riots that erupted across the
United States, and in deep South states in particular, like Alabama, Mississippi, Tennessee, and
Arkansas (Murakawa 2005). These rapid changes highlighted law enforcement’s role and placed
them in an unsavory position as enforcers of a racist, corrupt, and sometimes violent political
order. In many of the ugliest scenarios that played out, police were, in fact, executing their duty
to enforce the law; applying the prevailing rhetoric of the political order – laws that the nation
had begun to shed in earnest. During this period, law enforcement was more closely affiliated
with the local political organization and, with limited to no oversight and a lack of structural
integrity, was highly vulnerable to corruption and cronyism (Scheingold 1984).
Law enforcement were put in a highly adversarial role against the public, regularly
quashing protests, sit-ins and other peaceful manifestations of the constitutional rights to
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freedom of assembly and speech, and at times aiding and abetting the commission of crimes by
one group against the other (Bucerius and Tonry 2014; Rising 2010). This particular
characterization is critical, as the police mandate became confused with the seemingly
conflicting interests of an aspect of the State and the constitution which undergirds all law. Not
all law enforcement, of course, can be framed by the brutal police responses to protesters in
Birmingham, Alabama6 or Jackson, Mississippi7 for example; however, those highly visible
incidents were powerful in characterizing “the police” as a monolith, consequently subsuming
the institution; a fact that centralization would later exacerbate (Maguire 2003; Moore 2002).
Two other elements served to make this era a definitional one for police as an agency and as
individual agents: The President’s Crime Commission findings, and the so-called due process
revolution set in motion by the Supreme Court.
President Johnson’s Crime Commission, with the backdrop of the Great Society
initiatives, approached their work with a social sciences perspective, distributing crime control
responsibility across a number of social junctions, law enforcement being merely one of them
(Lee 2007). The commission recommended “sweeping” reforms to the performance indices of
police (Maguire 2003), recognizing the absence of the relationship-building and communitybased dimensions of maintaining order and peacekeeping. Those aspects were highlighted in the
Commission’s report as foundational to police work and necessary to the success of law
enforcement, even as a punitive tool, in the long run (“President’s Commission” 1967).
Ironically, the Commission itself, and its accompanying policy directives, were instrumental in

6

For more in-depth detail about the race riots in Birmingham, Alabama and the Freedom Riders, See Wilson (2015)
Freedom Riders.
7
Supra, note 6.
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empowering the exact opposite of a holistic assessment metric, birthing a highly standardized,
centralized data collection and performance-based apparatus (Beckett and Sasson 2004; Gest
2001). While that was critical to creating professional standards, it also skewed communitypolicing towards an inventory of penal assessment measures rather than an ongoing relational
dynamic.
The second key point, the due process revolution, impacted the institutional autonomy of
police even further. In landmark decision after landmark decision, the Supreme Court repudiated
harsh, strong-arm interrogation tactics and violent citizen confrontations by the police, defining a
right for the accused within the law (Kamisar 2000; Pye 1968). The law enforcement community
met these decisions with loathing and resentment, seen as infringements upon the police and
their powers (Lee 2007; Paoline 2001). As Maguire (2003) indicates “All of these factors
combined to produce an epidemic crisis of legitimacy for the American police” (5).
How these last two factors impacted the identity of the police manifested more clearly in
the individual than the organization. Scheingold (1984) reviews ethnographic research conducted
by Manning, Kirkham, and Kroes of officer attitudes and values, illuminating a police force that
recognizes itself as very much distant from the public. The shared assumptions Manning reveals
about police indicate a deep cynicism about the public; distrust in the legal system and rulemaking mechanisms; and self-reliance (100-3). Manning’s study finds that police believe the
public is ignorant of the challenges they face and cannot fathom the contexts within which police
operate, therefore making them unqualified critics (Scheingold 1984). These assumptions make
it easier for police to ignore critical voices and dismiss legitimate public complaints. Kroes
(1976) and Scheingold (1984) attribute these sentiments, in part, to the closed professional
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culture of law enforcement with its unique set of shared experiences; a fact that is true of most
specialized, professional organizations. In the case of law enforcement, the deliberation on
performance and reform occurring externally, such as in the case of the Supreme Court mandates
or Commission recommendations, has bolstered this culture in the organization, and helped
engrain the “us vs. them” doctrine in the individual. As was noted earlier, a lack of nurture for
the relational and communicational dimensions of policing, adapted the persona of the individual
officer in the adversarial role in an overarching sense.
Officers may be aware of the complexities of their occupation, but the adversarial role
becomes a fallback professional disposition. These early influences and definitions of law
enforcement have had a lasting impact on the police organization and contributed to developing
the popular image of police that persists, in some form, to this day. Across a number of
foundational aspects, such as measurement indices and law enforcement’s societal role / prestige,
these notions have been resistant to evolving interpretations of law enforcement work. This fact
is made clearer when considering evaluations of police performance from the early 1960s to
today, which have overwhelmingly concluded that the police is a more professional and
community-oriented organization (Bayley and Nixon 2010); yet, many of the conflicts, concerns
and motivations of the past, persist. Different interpretations of what professionalism and
community-based approaches look like in the real world, created a parallel growth of relationally
oriented and punitive policing. Innovations, such as community-oriented policing which focused
on police as a service provider, may have gained the most attention in the 1990s, when President
Bill Clinton instituted the Community Oriented Policing services (COPS) office, but it had its
origins in the Crime Commission’s findings (DeMichele and Kraska 2007; Maguire 2003a).
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Before leading to the constructivist approach of relationship building; the Commission’s focus
on broader societal and policy underpinnings to crime control led right into tough, zero-tolerance
policies.
The zero-tolerance narrative dictated that crime can be reduced through aggressive,
“proactive” policing (Lyons and Scheingold 2000). The body of research that emerged from the
early 1980s to early 1990s, articulated and even preached zero-tolerance as a preventative
measure. The seminal research of the zero-tolerance “era” is Wilson and Kelling’s (1982)
“broken windows” theory, which purports that crime can be reduced by cracking down on minor
offenses, thereby signaling that crime is not tolerated and creating safe, welcoming community
spaces. While some aspects of the theory have survived scrutiny, it has largely been discredited
by broader and more significant research to follow (See Lyons and Schiengold 2000; Meares
2015; Murakawa 2005). This theory became manifest in the midst of the “drug war”, and
particularly through its direct application in New York City in 1994 with significantly positive
results (Howell 2016)8. Of course, in many cities, New York perhaps the most conspicuous, the
zero-tolerance “era” is very much active today.
The impact of these policies on the police’s persona as both an organization and
individual officers, has again been punitive and confrontational, reinforcing an adversarial
relationship with the community. Instead of the service-oriented approach, especially towards
vulnerable demographics9, the broken windows policy made everyone a potential target for
See Chapter 4 for a more comprehensive breakdown of the effect of the “broken windows” theory and the success
of crime control strategies in New York City.
9
Vulnerable demographics refers to low-income and medically vulnerable community members, particularly
minorities, who have historically been a target of police misconduct and do not have access to the resources
necessary to redress their grievances.
8
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police as they practiced preventative and “predictive” policing (Howell 2016). This policy was
particularly toxic to the order maintenance and peacekeeping aspects of police work, which rely
on communication and partnerships within the community to succeed in enforcing the law. It
invariably affected those vulnerable demographics the most, leading to a circular pattern of
police attention, crack-downs, and community mistrust, leading to more police attention, crackdowns, and more public mistrust.
On the individual officer level, more robust research has emerged examining that aspect
closely. Undoubtedly, the organization exerts a great deal of power in shaping officers and
instituting practice and habits of mind within its structure; however, organizations are
surrounded by their own, unique, gravitational space that attracts specific interests to it. Early
attitudinal surveys of police recruits, such as those mentioned above, discuss attitudes of officers
after entering the force. In contrast, Sanders (2003), Courtright and Mackey (2006), Gray (2011),
and Harris (2016), investigate what attracts certain individuals to law enforcement careers
(police specifically), in the first place. Many of these studies focus on students pursuing criminal
justice careers, a route neither always necessary nor necessarily typical of police recruits as postsecondary education is only required in a limited percentage of police agencies (Bureau of
Justice Statistics – LEMAS 2013). Most police agencies who require post-secondary education
of at least two-years for their recruits are larger, urban police departments who, despite their
sizable forces, only makeup 2.6% of departments in the United States, with medium to small
departments and sheriff’s offices comprising the vast majority (Bureau of Justice Statistics –
LEMAS 2013). Nonetheless, these surveys provide some insight on the profiles of individuals
who choose to join the force. Courtright and Mackey (2006) and Gray (2011) both identify a
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higher propensity for punitiveness, lower levels of empathy, and greater rates of problematic
behaviors such as alcoholism and/or drug use, among students interested in policing careers.
Further to those findings, Courtright and Mackey (2006) indicate that criminal justice majors
were more ideologically conservative than those in other fields, and identified less with
rehabilitative responses to problem behaviors. This is consistent with the punitive, crime-fighter
image of the organization.
The impact of post-secondary education was found to be significant across these studies,
as research by Telep (2010) and Paoline et al. (2014) demonstrates statistically significant
attitudinal differences between policing career students at earlier and later stages in their
academic experience. Those at later stages present decreasing levels of punitiveness and
increasing levels of empathy, comparatively. Paoline et al. (2014) further differentiates between
academic experience through college education, and technical training through police academies,
with no such attitudinal changes being tracked in the latter. These last findings elucidate the
differences between common organizational perceptions of police work and actual occupational
and process knowledge. The implication here is that the law enforcement organization radiates a
culture that identifies less as a service organization and more as a crime-fighting force, with all
the implications of that distinction, previously defined. These findings are also significant as they
indicate the impact of education and academic development on officer behavior, a developmental
opportunity missed by fully 85%10 of formal police organizations across the United States
(Bureau of Justice Statistics – LEMAS 2013). It also buttresses this paper’s argument, furthered

10

Refers to academic training beyond high school, including non-degree and vocational training.
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by Harris (2016), that “problem officer” behaviors are not static, irreversible, or necessarily
inherent, but are “episodic” responses to perception bias generated by common narratives and
organizational culture, both inside and outside the police organization.
Though law enforcement work is undoubtedly defined by deeper notions of helping
others, fighting crime, and heroism, police list a range of reasons to join the force, including job
security and excitement. The RAND Corporation, commissioned by the Department of Justice
(DOJ), conducted a first of its kind survey in 2009 of new law enforcement recruits in 44 of the
largest11 police and sheriff’s agencies across the United States, representing all geographical
regions. The highest ranked motive was job security, with over 80% of respondents listing it as a
primary reason they applied to the academy; followed closely by helping others and employment
benefits such as retirement and health insurance (Figure 4) (Castaneda and Ridgeway 2010) 12.
Fully 87% of respondents indicated salary as being a major factor in their selection of a policing
career. These statistics may come as no surprise; however, it is important to highlight the fact
that finding a stable, good-salaried job is a central motivation for many police recruits, just as it
is with other, more conventional occupations. Though targeting slightly different police
populations, earlier police surveys conducted briefly after the start of their careers show similar
interest trajectories for respondents, indicating that these markers have not differed significantly
over time.

RAND defines “largest” as having more than 800 staff. Of the more than 15,000 formal police organizations in
the United States, only 108 agencies fall under that category, or barely 1%.
12
It should be noted that respondents were provided an inventory list with a least-to-most rating scale. As discussed
in Chapter 2, inventory response surveys in such settings are bias-prone as they channel responses into pre-selected
categories. It is reasonable to assume, however, that the distribution of interest is reflective of genuine perceptions.
11
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Figure 4

4 Source: RAND Law Enforcement Recruit Survey (Castaneda and Ridgeway 2010)

As police organizations moved out of the tumult of the 1960s and 1970s to a more
stabilized, theory-based punitive approach in the 1980s and 1990s, the persona of the officer and
organization began drifting towards militarization. This shift was due largely to the “war”
narrative permeating through the police organization, as the generalized “war on crime” of the
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1960s, became the more specific and specialized “war on drugs” in the 1980s and 90s. The war
narrative and use of militaristic rhetoric in reference to police operations, guided the
organizational and strategic culture of law enforcement even further away from a serviceoriented organization, operating in conjunction with the community. The police’s “job” – the
product of the centralized, professional evolution of police, carrying out a narrow punitive
mandate – allowed community-policing efforts to lead to, ironically, militarization as well
(DeMichele and Kraska 2007). Community policing, with its many definitional appearances, did
not necessarily denounce the “broken-windows” style of policing, but purported to work
responsively to those proactive enforcement efforts, ostensibly easing now “clean” communities
back into the fold of society (DeMichele and Kraska 2007). The militarization of law
enforcement culture made it easier for these seemingly contradictory ideologies to take hold, as
the fundamental differences between military and police mandates were blurred by the escalatory
nature of criminal justice policy and rhetoric.
3.2 Tactical Evolution and Militarization
As demonstrated above, the militarization of law enforcement has been ongoing for a
number of decades, with the rhetoric of war and battle starting from the 1960’s and consistently
becoming an applied reality in the early 1990’s. Despite the drop in the crime rate from an alltime high in the 1990’s, militarization has continued relatively unabated, increasing even. As
Kraska (2007) crucially points out, law enforcement essentially contains a military identity, both
being armed enforcement entities of the state13, and they cannot be entirely separated. Kraska

13

In the case of the United States. Not all police entities around the world are armed. In the UK, for example, only
tactical units are armed whereas street patrol officers do not carry weapons (Kelly 2012).
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(2007) therefore, clarifies that one must think of the police and military as being on a
“continuum,” each at opposite ends of the scale (37). There are, however, fundamental
differences in their respective ideologies; one being concerned with offensive engagement –
violent conflict and enemy deterrence through combat – and the other being concerned with
defensive engagement – order maintenance, peacekeeping and public service. The theatre of
military operations is a theatre of war, where peace is the anomaly; whereas the theatre of police
operations is a theatre of peace, where conflict is the anomaly. While order maintenance may
overlap with deterrence, it is the operative word “enemy” that makes the difference between both
mandates, and where the line of domestic crime control has blurred (Kraska 2001). There are
several junctures where police have shifted to and increased militarization, two in particular have
had the most significant impact on practical law enforcement militarization: the authorization of
the 1208 and 1033 programs in 1990 and 1997, respectively, and the terrorist attacks of
September 11th, 2001 and the resulting counterterrorism structure. Those two areas are what this
section will focus on.
The 1208 and 1033 programs are parts of the National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA), an annual appropriations bill that authorizes a broad array of budgetary and operational
defense requests. The NDAA of 1990, signed by President George H.W. Bush, instituted the
1208 program which authorized the transfer of surplus military equipment to state law
enforcement agencies, specifically for “counter-drug activities” (Grasso 2014). Although the
authorization was temporary, requiring annual renewal, and limited to counter-drug activities, its
impact was significant. Under the 1208 program, law enforcement agencies nationwide began
developing and expanding what Kraska and Cubellis (1997) describes as “police paramilitary
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units” or PPUs. PPUs include what are commonly referred to as SWAT (specialized weapons
and tactics) teams, but also go beyond that, as smaller “tactical” units and even more heavily
geared “specialized” units (Kraska and Cubellis 1997). SWAT teams existed, of course, prior to
1990 and the authorization of the 1208 program; however, they did not have access to military
equipment and especially not with such ease and cost-efficiency. The 1033 program, similarly
authorized under the NDAA of 1997, and signed by President Bill Clinton, took the 1208
program significantly further, allowing transfer of military surplus equipment to local law
enforcement agencies more broadly, without any requirement of purpose except a “preference”
for counter-drug and counter-terrorism activities (Grasso 2014; NDAA 1997). The 1033 program
also was made permanent, no longer requiring annual renewal and, by extension, review.
If the 1208 program significantly impacted the development and existence of PPUs, the
1033 program transformed it, with a broad range of law enforcement agencies coming online and
obtaining combat gear and battlefield equipment for their small, large, urban, and non-urban,
domestic police agencies. Across the effective life of these two programs, Kraska (2007) records
a “1400% increase in the total number of police paramilitary deployments” (6). Kraska (2007)
notes the significant rise in number of such PPUs, with “89% of police departments… serving
50,000 people or more [having] a PPU, almost double of what existed in the mid-1980s” (6),
with an even more significant increase in smaller locales, from 20% in the same time period, to
80% by the late 1990s. Participation in the 1033 program mandates use of the equipment within
one year of obtaining it, requiring the deployment of such equipment regardless of its necessity
(NDAA 104th Congress).
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The negative impact of the 1033 program multiplied after the events of September 11th
2001 as the provision metastasized into other grant programs, gained new leadership and grew
along with anti-terrorism units that emphasized tactical supremacy (Lutterbeck 2004). In a little
over 10 years, the amount of tactical gear transferred to local law enforcement from the federal
government increased 450 times, from $1 million of property in 1990 to $450 million in 2013
(“The War Comes Home” 2014, 24). Though the 1208 and 1033 programs existed in relative
obscurity as far as the public is concerned, the latter became more acknowledged as the
equipment equally became ever-more ubiquitous and powerful for domestic policing activities:
attack helicopters, armored personnel carriers (APCs) and mine-sweepers. This tactical shift was,
perhaps, most visible in the aftermath of the August 2014 shooting death of Michael Brown, by a
police officer in Ferguson, Missouri. The ensuing riots and demonstrations were responded to by
local police, donning battle gear and riding on the backs of armored military vehicles, a
development that had existed for some time, but rarely garnering such visibility.
Despite the steady progression towards militarization through these particular policies, no
single event has had as much impact as the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 (9/11),
which holds the distinction of creating one of the most integrated police/paramilitary law
enforcement structures in recent history (Waxman 2009). The significance of 9/11 to the change
in police identity is rooted in, what is by now, a recurring theme: centralization and
federalization. After the events of 9/11 a new umbrella agency was created: The Department of
Homeland Security (DHS). The establishment of this new department was peculiar in that its
operations were not constrained to particular fields of operation such as drugs, or even to the less
developed, but nonetheless particular, area of terrorism. The DHS therefore was a clearing house
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of law enforcement operations, whose purpose was to facilitate better information exchange,
gathering, and sharing between agencies across local, state, and federal jurisdiction lines.
The distinctive line between the service-oriented activities of a local police agency and
the enforcement focused role of a federal agency further blurred, making local police engage in
non-traditional federal roles such as “national security”, and creating a shared space for training
and tactical evolution towards a highly structured, central-authority based military model
(Waxman 2009). Kraska (2007) asserts that the shift in tactics and mandate between police and
the military occurs across the continuum, where the military has experienced a shift to more
police oriented activities, as well. This seepage of police activities into military operations, and
vice-versa, that Kraska (2007) notes is important as it captures the emerging identity of domestic
law enforcement as a paramilitary force, distancing it yet further from its peacekeeping and
service roles.
Following 9/11, another war was added to the lexicon of domestic policing: the war on
terror. Originally appearing as more international than domestic and more an issue for large ports
of entry such as New York City, the war on terror transformed into a domestic policing issue
with the DHS coordinating with local authorities and acting as a conduit for federal funding
(Waxman 2009). These developments only further increased the federal role in domestic policing
activities and encouraged small and medium sized departments to build specialized units, expand
existing PPUs, and seek further specialized training in counterterrorism and related programs.
Even if political focus shifted away from domestic criminality, law enforcement’s firm
grounding in the confrontational “war” mentality never wavered, gaining, in fact, further
credence with the prospect of an “international” threat. Once again, waging the war on terrorism,
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just as it has been with the war on crime and drugs before it, meant swift tactical transformation
for the police without the appropriate structural development necessary for rational
implementation. In addition to the strategic crisis of such a rapid shift, it creates an opportunity
for the federal government to step in more forcefully (Lutterbeck 2004).
The structural challenges and institutional tensions faced by law enforcement in trying to
reconcile a militaristic identity with a domestic policing agenda, are numerous and significant. A
comprehensive report, conducted by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and released in
2014, revealed just how extensive the chasm is between agency materiel and structural protocols.
The report found no real parameters for the deployment of SWAT teams, stating that the
threshold “depends largely on the subjective beliefs of the officers involved” rather than a welldefined matrix (“The War Comes Home” 32). The report further revealed that the vast majority
of SWAT raids, 79% of them, were deployed to execute search warrants and mostly for drug
related offenses with no clear justification given for why the search warrant was executed using a
tactical team as opposed to standard police units (“The War Comes Home” 2014). Of the over
800 SWAT deployments analyzed, a weapon was located on premise in just a third of the
incidents, and the amount of drugs netted through such violent raids was negligible – mostly not
exceeding quantities that qualify in the law as “personal use” (“The War Comes Home” 2014,
14;34). Adding to the argument of structural deficiency for such a role, the ACLU report found
“almost no oversight of SWAT at the state or local level,” hence the lack of guidelines for
deployment, and “no federal agency mandated to collect information related to… use of SWAT”
(28). While the ACLU report looked at 20 agencies across 11 states, the lack of data collection or
accumulation on SWAT deployments makes it difficult to fully capture the extent of its impact.
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The toll on the relationship between law enforcement and the communities in which they
operate, however, is undoubtedly significant.
3.3 Law Enforcement in Context
In the previous section we discussed aspects of professionalism; police growth towards
becoming professional, where police might fall short of professionalism, and how
professionalization has impacted policing in one way or another. With all this discussion of the
organizational distinctions that constitute a profession for police, it is worthy to pause and
consider what exactly constitutes a profession? In what ways can police be defined as such, or
not? How does policing measure up in context with other established professions? This section
seeks to identify the very basics of professionalism and the role of police within that definition,
in order to provide some solutions to problematic behaviors within the organization, later on. In
reviewing what constitutes a profession, I bring J.A. Jackson (1972) and Burke Christensen
(1994) to bear on the question. From the sociological perspective, Jackson provides a social
constructivist view of the construction and “attributes” of a profession. In contrast, Christensen, a
law and finance professor, approaches the topic more briskly, through an economic model. Both,
however, agree on the basic tenants of what constitutes a profession, which Christensen arranges
in five definitional criteria.
Before listing the “barriers to entry,” it is imperative to clarify the fundamental
differences between an occupation and a profession: unlike an occupation where the organization
and the individual act in their own self-interest, a profession and professionals “have a duty to
act in the interests of those they serve” (Christensen 1994, 28). Furthermore, a profession
requires a degree of specialized competence and expertise, which cannot be readily obtained in
54

the normal course of occupational training, i.e. an individual may walk into a store and become a
sales clerk, but one does not simply walk into a classroom and become a teacher. Christensen
(1994) describes this specialized knowledge as a complexity “that the common person does not
generally understand… and must rely on the expertise of another for proper completion of the
task” (28). Broadly, a profession can be described as: a) requiring academic study and
certification; b) specialized disciplinary training; c) a code of ethical conduct “which exceeds the
mere requirements of the law;” and, d) having a broader “association” of oversight and
organizational development (Christensen 1994, 28).
The police, by the above criteria, do meet the requirements of a profession, but are
muddled on some areas. Fundamentally, the police is a service organization, where agencies and
their agents (officers) serve the public interest, not their own. They are also an organization of
sufficient complexity as to require specialization and training, both academic and disciplinary, as
well as certification. Police also have a code of ethics and conduct; however, not a single
governing body that can provide oversight on adherence to that code. The code of ethics and
conduct developed and adopted by The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) has
more or less been the standard since its writing and revision in 1957 and 1991, respectively
(Grant 2002). Though the IACP has limited membership of United States law enforcement
agencies, it nevertheless has been an important organization in the structure of law enforcement,
due to its qualities of being a professional association (Grant 2002). This is also where the nature
of police as a profession has some ambiguities, due to the fact that its professional associations
either have low/incomplete membership, or are hard-pressed to identify as professional
associations, with the accompanying academic depth and related certification/accreditation
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processes (Grant 2002). Of course, unlike other professions, the police are a part of the state –
the political order. They are government employees and, as such, are perceived (if not actually)
to follow the general direction of the broader umbrella of government: legislative guidance,
executive accountability, and political oversight.
Though they serve the public, police are not accountable directly to the public; serving
the public interest is synonymous with serving the government’s interest which, in theory, exists
to serve the public. Legislation by public representatives (Congress) create law which police, in
turn, enforce. The executive power to enforce the law is that which is vested in it by the
Constitution and carried out by law enforcement, an entity whose power is limited by its
definitional extent, and the proscribed rules and procedures, legally drawn. That definitional
extent, as defined by Justice Lemuel Shaw, is: “the power vested in the legislature by the
constitution, to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws,
statutes and ordinance, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they
shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same”
(Horwitz 1995). It could be concluded from the above, that law enforcement may bear less of the
burden of public service than in other professions, since they may view themselves as enacting
agreed upon rules, set forth by others, hence the axiom that police don’t make the law, they only
enforce it. This one-dimensional approach, however, overlooks the fact that law enforcement is
not the police’s only task, but a part of the complex of work that encompasses public safety
(Moore 2002). The subjectivity that is undeniably a part of police decision-making makes such
‘impartial’ application of the law wishful thinking, at best.
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Because police, the state, and the public interest, are so interdependent as subjects, it can
be difficult to follow a conversation with such abstraction. A good example of such a
construction is the system of public advocacy – lawyers. Lawyers do not work for the
government exclusively, yet prosecutors do; they are lawyers serving the government and are
thereby advocates on behalf of the public interest; hence the statement: “The People vs. John
Doe.” Lawyers have a centralized system of organization with various levels of professional
recognition. No one can enter law school to earn the degree that would allow him/her to practice
law without first obtaining an undergraduate degree in some discipline and achieving a sufficient
score on the Law School Admission Test (LSAT). And no lawyer, even after graduating from
law school, can practice law without passing the relevant bar exam. The American Bar
Association (ABA), who administers the bar exam, is essentially an accreditation body and is
responsible for oversight of the community of lawyers and holds them to accepted ethical
standards. These ethical obligations imposed by the ABA on licensees go beyond the
requirements of the law. Lawyers can be disciplined within the organization, even if their
conduct has not risen to the level of illegality, and the discipline can be suspension from the
practice of law (American Bar Association, Rule 18).
The ABA as a body is informed by academic research and supplemented by the
contributions from various professionals within the legal community, enriching and evolving the
field. These levels of and opportunities for oversight, accreditation, research, and professional
development, from within the field, help advance the profession of law on a broad spectrum. The
operative word ‘within’ is important, as law enforcement has often been informed by specialists
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outside of the direct specialty of police work, causing some organizational tension (See 3.1,
above).
Other professions also have a similar structural schema, regardless of their level of
governmental involvement. Medicine has a number of bodies of accreditation for generalists and
specialists, with a robust research community, opportunities for oversight, and portals for
professional development throughout one’s career. Law enforcement, however, lacks such a
robust structure, relies on internal mechanisms for oversight that lack uniformity, are not
beholden to a universal standard of ethics enforceable from within the field, and do not have a
single threshold for entry. Training and education varies widely from one agency to another,
dictated by the size of the agency, the budget, and the locale. Sherriff’s offices have, in general,
lower thresholds of admittance and do not require any secondary education, in many cases, even
though they make up a sizable portion of law enforcement agencies in the United States (Bureau
of Justice Statistics 2008). This despite the fact that the work of law enforcement – public safety
– is the same regardless of locale, agency size, budget, or demographics and the consequences
are just as significant – the power to take life and/or liberty.
Of course, this is not to presume that every law enforcement agency faces the same
challenges – it is an essential part of the argument of this paper that they do not – but that the
underlying mandate of the profession is similar enough as to require a standardized minimum for
the field. Centralization in law enforcement, I argue, is therefore beneficial only when it
emanates from within, and when it serves to elevate the prestige of the organization’s members
to where they contribute to the development of their profession and not simply partake in its
activities. In context, law enforcement, while meeting the minimum standards of a profession,
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fall short where that distinction of professionalization can move its bearer from the toil of labor
to the pride of service.
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CHAPTER 4: A CASE APPROACH

Throughout the contemporary history of American law enforcement, no single case has
had greater influence on policing nor has been as oft analyzed or cited than the storied
transformation of New York City through the mid-1990s. There is good reason for the attention.
In a period of five years, New York City, which had hit a peak of 2,245 murders in 1990,
brought the murder rate down by 52 percent (Greene 1999). The rates of other crimes were down
too; felony complaints had gone down 44.3 percent and the reduction in robberies and burglaries
was close to 50 percent (Greene 1999). New York City’s secret weapon was purportedly its zerotolerance crime control and policing strategy, which applied the “broken windows” theory
discussed earlier, cracking down on petty crime and delinquency that otherwise could
presumably “lead… to more serious crime problems.” (Greene 1999, 172). In 1990 New York
City elected a new mayor, David Dinkins, who took swift action to expand what was at the time,
a shrinking police force. The closing years of the 1980s were unkind to New York City
economically, mirroring the national economic recession, just as the crime rate remained
unusually high, nationwide (Ehrenhalt 1993).
Dinkins started the shift in the City’s rapidly rising crime numbers, working with an
architect of community policing policies, Lee Brown, to institute a broad range of social
programs aimed at crime reduction for at-risk youth, and adding thousands of patrol officers
(Greene 1999). But it was a new mayor, Rudolph Giuliani, elected in 1993, who would be
credited with the biggest changes. Giuliani appointed William Bratton as commissioner of the
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New York Police Department (NYPD) and it was he who implemented the strict, zero-tolerance,
broken windows policing along with COMPSTAT – a software program that helps compile
crime data and track enforcement benchmarks. The rapid decrease of New York City’s crime
rate in the period from 1993 to 1997 was remarkable. In fact, New York City has taken credit for
the reduction in crime on the national level, with Giuliani pointing out that the City’s crime
numbers accounted for nearly a third of national figures14 (Greene 1999). Fagan, Zimring, and
Kim (1998) posit “If this drop can be plausibly tied to enforcement activities, it would be the
most conspicuous success of city police deployment policies in the twentieth century” (1278).
While Bratton’s zero-tolerance crackdown has been credited almost entirely for the
dramatic turnaround, broken windows policing was not the only transformation Bratton brought
onto the department. In addition to the COMPSTAT program, Bratton transformed the
organization of the NYPD; decentralizing authority to precinct level away from headquarters,
redistributing and integrating specialized units across the department, and integrating
benchmarks and data supplementation to patrol units (Greene 1999). While Bratton championed
the “tough-on-crime” approach as the answer to the City’s problems, and indeed those of any
other similarly situated city, an entire organizational shift, including community-level actions
enacted by his predecessor, had also been instrumental in bringing about the change (Eterno and
Silverman 2012). Judith Greene’s insightful evaluation of the effectiveness of zero-tolerance
policies versus more community-based approaches echoes other scholarly analyses of this
question. The case comparison Greene makes in her analysis is between New York City and San

14

See Questions on statistical integrity below for an explication of how crime numbers are evaluated and reported.
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Diego; two, large, metropolitan, American cities, with large multiethnic, urban populations.
Using Greene’s comprehensive analysis of the case, I will summarize the findings, taking note of
specific actions and outcomes. It is not my intention, however, to use this as a case study in
effective policing strategies, but instead as a means to understand the law enforcement role and
its organizational and political dimensions. Later in the chapter, I will explore a case study
within New York City itself.
Plenty of scholarship has looked at these two cases as the rise and fall of crime in both
cities for the same period, has been relatively parallel, hence its comparative robustness, with
one major difference: San Diego’s approach was the diametrical opposite of New York City’s.
Just as Giuliani and Bratton were instituting their zero-tolerance policies, San Diego took the
initiative to apply “neighborhood policing” strategies – a service oriented policing model that
focused on community partnerships and cooperative enforcement (Greene 1999). Greene (1999)
notes that many of the outcomes set by the San Diego Police Department (SDPD) paralleled
those set by the NYPD: eliminating “safe havens” for crimes and criminals; decreasing visibility
of neglect within the city; reorganizing patrol sectors; and bringing technology to automate data
collection and utilization (178). The SDPD, however, undertook these actions and achieved these
goals by partnering with the community, using citizen information to reorganize the patrol
sectors, enlisting civilian volunteers to identify areas of concern and vulnerability within the
community and report criminal activity, using new data collection tools for field reporting, and
focusing on providing “victims assistance services” (Greene 1999, 183).
In the five-year period from 1990 to 1995, the SDPD achieved nearly the same reduction
in crime levels: 36.8 percent to New York City’s 37.4 percent, using almost seven times less
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patrol officers (Greene 1999). Using the effective dates when both programs were fully instated
in New York City and San Diego, respectively, starting in 1993, as crime numbers continued
their significant decline across both locales, gaping disparities in the community impact began
emerging. Greene (1999) shows that, while the NYPD recorded record increases in arrests, “23
percent across the board,” including a 40 percent increase in misdemeanor arrests, the SDPD was
recording reductions in arrest rates, “15 percent across the board” (183-4). Even more significant
was the vast difference in number of citizen complaints. With the instituting of zero-tolerance
policies, citizen complaints of police misconduct in New York City skyrocketed, increasing 58
percent under Mayor Giuliani (Greene 1999). In addition, “legal filings of new civil rights claims
against the police for abusive conduct have increased 75 percent” in the same time period
(Greene 1999, 176). By contrast, in San Diego, citizen complaints had actually begun decreasing
following the implementation of the neighborhood policing strategy (Greene 1999). The
meteoric rise of citizen complaints in New York City and apparent police abuse has been one of
the cornerstone complaints against ‘broken-windows’ policing (See Collins 1998; Howell 2017;
Meares 2015).
Researchers have made the point that “aggressive” policing did not necessarily equate to
successful policing if the police themselves become a source of fear rather than sanctuary, for the
public. Given the relative similarity in crime reduction rates, it is impossible to point to
aggressive policing strategies, such as those implemented in New York City, and posit that they
are the only means to achieving community control. While New York City has undergone a
number of changes in its City leadership, including police commissioners, precipitous reductions
in citizen complaints, and reform in policing conduct, the mean number of citizen complaints in
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the City remains high, as well as the legacy of aggressive policing tactics that have been
integrated – to an extent – into the NYPD’s organizational identity (Eterno 2007; Howell 2017).
In San Diego, citizen complaints have decreased overall, while the police force has not grown
very substantially in the subsequent ten years, despite population growth. The indication here
being that a service-oriented policing strategy may have, as Greene (1999) notes, a positive
effect over the long term, through community integration rather than alienation.
4.1 New York City, circa 1990s
New York City is comprised of five major boroughs (similar to the organization of a
county or parish) spread over an area of only 305 square miles (U.S. Census 2010). With a
population hovering at around 7.4 million throughout the 1990s, more than the populations of
Los Angeles and Chicago combined, New York City was, and still is, the largest city in the
United States (U.S. Census 1994; 2010). The NYPD is an equally large organization, one of the
largest police agencies in the United States. According to their website, the NYPD employs more
than 34,000 uniformed personnel, across eight regional commands and 39 police precincts
(NYPD “About”). The national index crime rate, which takes into account all categories of
crime, had been climbing steadily for a decade, throughout the 1980s, reaching its peak in 1992,
and falling steadily thereafter (Uniform Crime Reports, United States). The story is only slightly
different for New York City, where the trend line has not been as smooth; the index crime rate
rose sharply at the beginning of the decade before dropping, marginally, from 1983 to 1987, then
rising again until 1992 when it began steadily declining (Uniform Crime Reports, New York).
The index crime rate, however, measures all categories of crime and because property
crime comprises the vast majority of all crime committed it also weighs heavier in a total index
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crime measure. Looking at violent crime (which includes rape, armed robbery and assault) and
homicide measures gives a different impression of the problem. In New York City, the homicide
rate reached a historic peak of 14.5 murders per 100,000 people in 199015, higher than the
previous peak of 12.7 in 1980 (Uniform Crime Reports, New York). Nationally, the homicide
rate was at 9.4 for the same year, still an elevated number but below the peak of 10.2, also in
1980. Violent crime had reached a peak in New York City in 1990 and ’91 as well, however,
violent crime had fallen nationally from its highest level in 1981 (Bureau of Justice Statistics
1994). Large cities, especially ports of entry, with large urban areas, transient populations and
inevitably significant financial disparities across the population, pose unique and significant
challenges to law enforcement. New York City, the financial capital of one of the largest
economies in the world, perhaps more so. So, as crime levels rose and sustained at high levels, it
seemed a daunting task to bring it into check.
It is important to foreground the “revolution” of policing, in police commissioner
William Bratton’s words (Bratton 1998, 31), with some historical context. Across the 1980’s
violent crime levels in New York City were fluctuating, but comparably high, nearly reaching
the peak level of 1990 in 1985 (Fagan, Zimring and Kim 1998). Crime had reached its statistical
“crisis” level in the early 1980s nationally, and though it had not dropped with any consistency it
had begun to fluctuate to lower levels going into the 1990s (Uniform Crime Reports, United
States). The same is true for violent crime and especially homicides. When Mayor David Dinkins
took office in 1990, New York City’s first and only African American mayor, he had a
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A single arson incident, the Happy Land Social Club fire in 1990, where 87 people were killed, impacted the
homicide rate which skewed the total. If the crime was counted as a single incident, the homicide rate would not be
historically high, though, it would be comparable to the peak of 1980 (Joanes 2000).
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significant responsibility before him. Dinkins appointed former Houston mayor and criminal
justice professor Dr. Lee Brown as commissioner, where the latter immediately instituted a study
and review of the department’s structure and requirements (McElroy, Cosgrove and Sadd 1993).
Brown brought his own community policing legacy, serving at the helm of three other
large police departments in major cities, where he instituted “Neighborhood-Oriented Policing”
in Houston and Atlanta, transforming the structure of those departments, increasing the diversity
of the police force, and creating strong connections between police and the neighborhoods they
worked in (Brown 1989). Brown brought that same outlook to New York City, instituting
community policing policies across the City, and reshuffling the existing force to create more
patrol units. The new decentralized structure that Brown instituted created the foundation for
what Bratton would later expand on, shifting control to area chiefs and away from headquarters
(McElroy, Cosgrove and Sadd 1993). The result of Brown’s study and recommendations led to
Dinkins’ Safe Streets Program which put an additional 6,000 police officers on the street and
created funding for crime prevention programs, including inner-city school and youth diversion
programs (Greene 1999). Though Brown was strongly against it, Dinkins also appointed a
civilian review board and an external panel to address issues of police misconduct and to review
citizen complaints, expanding oversight of the NYPD. In addition, Brown, with support and
funding from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF), began “an ambitious gun
interdiction program” that led to the capture of large weapons caches (Greene 1999, 174).
These significant foundational changes in the operative culture of the NYPD began to
impact crime numbers, rapidly. By the end of 1992, the crime rate had already begun to drop,
and both homicide and violent crime levels had decreased by eight and nine percent, respectively
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(Uniform Crime Reports, New York). Mayor Dinkins lost his re-election bid to Rudy Giuliani
and Giuliani took over as Mayor of New York City in 1993, appointing William Bratton as
police commissioner. A former police chief in Boston, Massachusetts, Bratton headed New
York’s Transit Police for 2-years under Dinkins, where he operated within the organizational
structure of the former mayor; there, he pursued similar zero-tolerance strategies, arresting large
numbers of people on subways for fare evasion (Greene 1999). Now at the helm of the NYPD
itself, Bratton expanded his zero-tolerance policies across the City, redirecting police to focus on
low-level crime in an effort to stem greater types of violence (Bratton 1998). He instituted an
aggressive truancy program that saw police get more and more involved in youth delinquency
from schools and punished consistently trespassing, loitering, and panhandling, among other
petty offenses (Bratton 1998). Alongside Mayor Giuliani, Bratton added thousands more officers
to the police force and setup the COMPSTAT program, a computer program that provides data
compilation and tracking in real-time to patrol units and precincts in order to buttress
enforcement efforts and keep track of crime hotspots (Bratton 1998).
In addition to COMPSTAT, Bratton continued the organizational shift of his predecessor
by re-organizing the police hierarchy so as to give area chiefs more control and freedom of
movement. The crime rate continued to drop. Violent crime and homicides were starting to see
record reductions as time accumulated. By 1995, crime numbers had dropped significantly and
homicide rates were nearly cut in half (Greene 1999). But, another trend was taking place
parallel to the dropping crime numbers: skyrocketing public complaints and civil suits against
the police. The aggressive policing tactics, large-scale arrests, and zero-tolerance policies, were
causing communities to shudder from the police; many complained that their rights had been
67

violated. As Collins (1998) indicates, the public was “victimized” by police “in the name of
[law] enforcement” (13). The oversight and review boards put in place by Dinkins his last year in
office was in response to growing concern that the internal affairs division of the NYPD was
ineffectual in dealing with internal corruption; now, these boards were receiving hundreds of
misconduct complaints from the public.
The inverse relationship between citizen complaints and zero-tolerance policing
strategies in New York City, has led observers and researchers to conclude that public rights and
civil liberties could not be protected fully while police also carried out a robust enforcement
program (Collins 1998). An academic conversation began to develop around the true impact of
effective policing strategies in high-crime areas, and whether one must compromise on
individual rights in the name of public safety (Skolnick and Fyfe 1993). This argument has not
entirely abated, as the Giuliani-Bratton era of policing has been held up as one of the greatest
achievements in contemporary law enforcement. For many in the law enforcement community,
the New York City example is a testament to the success of zero-tolerance and broken-windows,
and how policing “ought” to be (Joanes 2000). Though scholarship has since developed that
demonstrates that New York City’s “transformation” was not as statistically anomalous,
significant, or singular as first assumed (Fagan, Zimring and Kim 1998); and that distributes the
credit for the significant drop in crime numbers across a number of factors and individuals
(Joanes 2000), Bratton’s portrayal in his book “Turnaround” (1998) has endured. Adding to the
argument of the clash between civil liberties and effective enforcement was the incongruity in
the pattern of complaints.
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A precinct-by-precinct breakdown of the complaint patterns conducted by the New York
City Public Advocate, cited by Greene (1999), shows precincts with the highest minority
populations accounting for the largest increases in complaints, with “Nine out of 76 precincts
account[ing] for more than 50 percent of the excess in complaint incident rates” (176). Such
increased confrontation, coupled with police reticence towards the institution of a robust
oversight and review process, especially one that is independent and civilian led, has sparked
concern about the motivations and outcomes of how police engage with their communities.
Minorities, especially African-Americans, are overwhelmingly the victims of crime in these
areas, as well as the perpetrators, and the patterns of abuse arising from these complaints indicate
that they are also, overwhelmingly, the victims of police misconduct; cementing a sense of
mistrust and discrimination from the police despite crime affecting all.
4.2 A Tale of Two Precincts
As before, drawing out the organizational structure and behavior allows the recording of
differences that shed light on possible causes. Davis, Mateu-Gelabert and Miller (2005) address
the question of coexistence between public rights and robust enforcement in their
groundbreaking statistical analysis of complaints across precincts, with specific attention to two
of them. As mentioned above, the new policies took effect across the City and citizen complaints
also rose across the City, though complaints in certain areas were much higher than in others. In
particular, Davis, Mateu-Gelabert, and Miller (2005) examine the practices of the 42nd and 44th
precincts who, in the midst of the crackdown, managed to keep their complaint numbers in
check, even reducing them. The 42nd and 44th precincts are in one of the most populous and
criminally affected of the boroughs: The Bronx. As we noted earlier, the highest citizen
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complaint rates were out of the Bronx as well. So, what are these two precincts doing differently
in order to seemingly illicit such a different response? This was the same question that Davis,
Mateu-Gelabert, and Miller (2005) posed and what they found out was, on an administrative
level, officer interactions with the public were more highly scrutinized; citizen complaints were
given much more import and would be directly dealt with at a high level; there was considerably
more oversight on officer’s actions as related to the public than in other precincts (227-230).
They point out that no “special programs” were instituted to affect this change, instead it was
directly due to “COs [commanding officers] who held the officers in their command to high
standards and who had a commitment to reducing civilian complaints” (Davis, Mateu-Gelabert,
and Miller 2005, 239).
In 1997, the NYPD did institute a special program, the “courtesy, professionalism, and
respect policy” which aimed to develop better relations with the community as a reaction to the
surge in public complaints (Davis, Mateu-Gelabert, and Miller 2005). The new program enjoyed
tepid success elsewhere in New York City, however, in the 42nd and 44th precincts, it appeared
dramatically effective. Compared to civilian complaint levels in 1993, both precincts saw
reductions of “54% and 64%, respectively” in complaints; in contrast to a “citywide” increase of
39% (Davis, Mateu-Gelabert, and Miller 2005, 233). What is important to note is that when
interviewed about the reduced number of complaints, officers themselves had little awareness of
the reason why, attributing it to a reduction in enforcement activities and a reduction in crime
within the precinct, both conclusions discredited by the data (Davis, Mateu-Gelabert, and Miller
2005, 239). However, these particular findings are critical to highlight. The officers’ responses
indicate that the closer scrutiny of their behavior; higher professional standards; increased
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attention to their conduct in contact with the public; and, direct disciplinary measures did not
reduce their perceived effectiveness nor did it conflict with their role. To the contrary, they
appeared to reflect a more favorable view of the community, including the assumption that there
was less crime. Davis, Mateu-Gelabert, and Miller (2005) cite the precincts’ commanding
officers’ “particularly strong commitment to respectful policing,” as the source of the change,
highlighting their “empha[sis] that police officers and supervisors were now held accountable for
citizen complaints and instilling pride when civilian complaints were down in their precincts”
(239). Special attention was given to repeat offenders, including being taken off their duties and
transferred elsewhere – real consequences that challenged the law enforcement culture that lacks
serious oversight of officer behavior and does not extend much import or consequence to civilian
complaints.
What is demonstrated through the case study of New York City’s 42nd and 44th precincts,
is that the organizational culture within law enforcement – as is the case with other professional
associations – and the governing policy of the institution, exerts incredible power over behavior,
role perception, and ultimately the real outcomes on the ground. How the relationship between
the police officer and the public was illuminated –in this case, one of mutual respect where the
civilian’s opinion was given import – impacted the outcome of the interaction and therefore the
material consequences of the enforcement activity. Even with such a robust enforcement
program as that instated in New York City, a relatively minor recalibration in the contextual
space between officer and civilian, yielded far-reaching results demonstrated in the reactions of
both the officers and the public. Often, shifts towards a more community/service-oriented
policing structure is accompanied with internal grumbles from officers who complain of
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becoming “social workers” or worse, being “emasculated” (Gould 2000, 25-6). However, in this
case, the officer’s responses reflected no such demoralization. What it did reflect was a need for
true professionalization – standards of practice that were expressive of law enforcement’s role as
a service organization.
Citing Walker, Davis, Mateu-Gelabert, and Miller (2005) posit that “police misconduct is
best understood not as a few bad apples but as the product of failed organizations. Attempts to
reduce misconduct must focus on how to change the organizational culture of police
departments” (244-5). I would take that a step further and suggest that to change misconduct at
the scale it has reached, is to change the organizational culture of law enforcement as a whole.
The politics of the institution that has shaped the public into an enemy and made oversight an
annoyance rather than an integral part of a working system, are the politics that disadvantage
police and prevent a cooperative partnership between the public and law enforcement.
4.3 Questions on statistical integrity
Statistical analysis is often an integral part of crime measurement and therefore deserves
further attention. After the development of the index crime system and the FBI’s Uniform Crime
Reporting (UCR) database in the wake of President Johnson’s Crime Commission, crime
statistics became critical to quantifying crime as well as policy and organizational effectiveness.
As described in Chapter 3, this had a serious impact on law enforcement’s persona and its
organizing principles. Because abstract notions of public service and community policing are
harder to quantify, organizational development and policy shifted ever more towards an
enforcement-centered strategy instead based on crime indices, instead of a comprehensive one
that took into account other aspects of police activity (Fielding and Innes 2006). The tools and
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means of measurement, however, are not a perfect science. In addition to the UCR system being
opt-in for law enforcement, meaning agencies voluntarily provide information and are not
required to participate, it is very much governed by the varying interpretations and
categorizations of crime in different locales. For example, sexual assault is defined differently in
Texas (which has a narrow interpretation of assault) than in Washington state (which has a
broader interpretation). Therefore, as they both report crime incidence to the UCR, the number of
assaults reported in Washington may appear greater than those reported in Texas, not because of
objective differences in assault rates, but because of definitional inconsistency between the two
locales (Johnson 2015; Savage 2012).
Definitional inconsistences also go beyond legislative interpretations of a certain type of
crime, such as in the above comparison between Texas and Washington, but pertain to agency
definitions of crime, particularly those perpetrated by officers (Gruber and Schmidt 2015).
Because the UCR only collects data on “justifiable” homicides perpetrated by police, no true
dataset exists to quantify the number of deaths at the hands of officers that occur annually. And
even justifiable homicide data is miniscule, with 4.4% of agencies reporting officer-involved
shootings. This problem was highlighted by FBI director James Comey, who commented on the
incomplete data in the aftermath of the shooting death of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri
(Comey 2015).
Beyond that, the integrity of the statistics reported to the UCR themselves have come
under scrutiny. Veteran New York Police Department (NYPD) officer and criminologist, John
Eterno, along with criminal justice professor Eli Silverman track the problem of statistical
integrity in New York City with extensive detail in their book “The Crime Numbers Game.”
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Eterno and Silverman (2012) submit that significant pressures are exerted internally, within the
police agency, to demonstrate reduced crime numbers in certain areas or times, and that such
practice has led to “unethical conduct” in pursuing, recording, and submitting data on crime
incidence (53). Though Eterno and Silverman’s study is limited to the NYPD, and particularly
during the Bratton era (as police commissioner), it signifies a concern that undoubtedly exists
across the country in any number of police agencies.
If statistics can and are being manipulated to produce a desired result, inconsistent with
crime incidence, then this creates fundamental concerns about the integrity of the data as a
whole. Such a problem is not entirely surprising given the significant pressure upon law
enforcement agencies to respond directly to index crime rates, irrespective of the conditions that
give rise to such statistical fluctuations. This adds additional credence to this research’s argument
for a comprehensive view of police work that takes into account all dimensions, not merely that
of enforcement. Eterno and Silverman (2012) touch on the organizational aspect as well, positing
that a blind focus on statistics results in “diminished quality and distorted delivery” of police
services (including enforcement), adding that “distorted police activity” has long term
consequences on the communities which are impacted by such erratic policing behavior (64-68).
These and other, similar, concerns draw attention to the reliability of the standards used by a
variety of sources to quantify crime and develop policy. The greater concern, however, remains
the levels of variance in crime incidence within the United States from one locale to the other,
and the fallacy of generalization based on such numbers.
In the previous section we looked at New York City’s crime rate transformation,
referencing a comment by then Mayor Rudy Giuliani’s office regarding the impact of New York
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City on national crime numbers, which he stated accounted for nearly a third of that rate. Mayor
Giuliani was not wrong, in fact, if anything, he had underestimated the City’s impact on national
crime figures. According to Silverman (1997), the reductions in New York City’s crime rate for
a two-year period from 1995 “accounted for over 60% of the national decline in crime” (3,
emphasis added). While a remarkable change on its face, the fact that a single city could impact
the national crime rate so profoundly is a very worrisome finding – one that belies a deeper flaw
in the way crime is quantified altogether. It can only be inferred that a spike or drop in the crime
rates of a number of individual large cities, put together, can distort the aggregate national crime
rate significantly. This is especially true for homicide, which amounts to an exceptionally small
number of total crime committed (Surette 2007) and therefore is much more responsive to
miniscule changes.
According to Fagan, Zimring and Kim (1997), New York City’s meteoric decline,
particularly in homicides, was not that unprecedented after all, when compared to an aggregate
of 14 other major U.S. cities and their respective five-year decline rates, ranking third after
Pittsburgh and Houston, respectively. Houston, whose five-year period mimics that of New York
City (1991-1996), experienced a 59% decline in homicide rates compared to New York City’s
51% (Fagan, Zimring and Kim 1997, 1280-3). These numbers are significant to the metrics of
crime rates because they demonstrate the small number of cities needed to impact the national
rate by a large margin. Fagan, Zimring and Kim (1997) note that, across the time period they
surveyed from 1950-1996, the fourteen major U.S. cities compared had a mean reduction in
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homicide rates of 40%, further supporting the assumption that, put together, these cities may
account for more than two-thirds of the national crime rate16
For statistical purposes, the fallacy of applying aggregate level statistics to individual
level anomalies needs no qualification. In the case of crime rates, the national crime rate values
are generally considered an overall statistic, as DOJ commissioned, National Institute of Justice
reports regularly reinforce the axiom that “all crime is local” (Lattimore et al., 1997, 3).
Numerous studies have also reinforced the fact that crime is a contextual phenomenon that can
be impacted by any number of environmental factors, including; economic, social and political
issues (e.g. Blumstein and Rosenfeld 1998; Richerson, Mulder and Vila 2001). Such factors
might lead one to presume that centralized, aggregate national-level data would not be a critical
resource to define policy for a highly decentralized problem, such as crime. However, it is.
Descriptive, social statistics are mitigated and mediated by many variables that affect their
accuracy and create causation and correlation problems. The data sets’ availability and accuracy
says nothing about its interpretation and comparative muster as Mosher, Methe and Hart (2011)
write in “The Mismeasure of Crime:”
Before taking corrective action based on such statistical information, however, it is important to
consider several questions about its accuracy and how the data are collected… Unfortunately,
however, many people who use these statistics are grossly uninformed about how they are
collected, what they mean, and their strengths and limitations (5-6).
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Rate when comparing cities in the same time period, e.g. New York City and Houston. Because elevation and
decline trends over five-year periods, as surveyed in Fagan, Zimring and Kim, do not directly overlap, these rates
are only indicated as a demonstration of the cyclical nature of sharp rises and declines in homicide rates over a
number of large U.S. cities, with populations of 250,000 or more.

76

Despite that, Mosher, Methe and Hart (2011) submit “It is…not uncommon for this type of
numerical data to form the basis of public policy. In fact, public health programs, law
enforcement, and other agencies rely on such descriptive statistics to implement various types of
reform” (6). The data sets themselves may be accurately measured and/or collected; how they are
deployed and exactly to what and where they are applied can make a tremendous difference in
the integrity of the statistical results.
Not all research has rejected the national crime trend hypothesis. McDowell and Loftin
(2009) do a commendable job of trying to identify and define such a national trend, while
acknowledging the local nature of criminality and crime control. Their results indicate, if only
preliminarily, the emergence of a “national pattern” of crime, and “strong, nationwide trends,”
(319). McDowell and Loftin argue that a nationwide trend underlies local conditions, rather than
being secondary to them, however, their research results show the local and national trends are
most strongly correlated for the largest cities, with populations of over 500,000. Rather than
demonstrating a national trend per se, these results seem to indicate that large urban centers have
a skewing effect on aggregate crime rates creating a “false positive” for the existence of an
independent national trend. Additionally, other factors presented in McDowell and Loftin’s
research seem to substantiate the impact of national policy on crime trends on the city-level,
where “The results nevertheless continue to credit national-level factors with a major role in
producing local rate changes” (2009, 317 emphasis added). Though McDowell and Loftin make
no attempt to define those factors, other research has illuminated national public policy as a
source for the centralization of criminality and its response (Beckett and Sasson 2004; Simon
2009; Murakawa 2005), which may provide some explanation for the trend.
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What is of particular interest is the circular relationship between the misuse and/or
misrepresentation of crime statistics (Mosher, Methe and Hart 2011) and a number of responsive
measures, such as public interest and concern (Boushey 2015), media portrayals (Surette 2007)
and, by extension, public policy (Boushey 2015). Far from arguing motivation for a central
response to crime, what McDowell and Loftin may have uncovered is the influence of the
political narrative and centralized policy on the mapping of deviance (both problem and
response) through the mechanisms of crime control, chiefly law enforcement. It should be clearly
stated that this discussion is in no way a rebuke of social statistics with regards to crime;
quantitative analysis is an incredibly critical component to the evaluation of all types of activity,
crime undoubtedly being one. Instead, it is the way such statistics are deployed, how informed
the users of that information are, and how complete or applicable the data is, that warrants pause.
With the significance that much of crime statistics carry in terms of state power and policy, the
integrity of the data is subject to compromise through manipulation and misrepresentation when
convenient.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

Law enforcement has long been the subject of research, debate, and criticism as one of
the fundamental apparatuses of a functioning society. Its unique position as the armed
enforcement mechanism of the state has earned it much scrutiny from observers of diverse
interest and affiliation. Less scrutiny, however, has been placed on crime itself and its emergence
in the 21st century as an organizing, political principle. Independently, extensive scholarship
documents manipulation of the crime narrative to achieve policy objectives; the relationship
between crime as policy and the direction of changes in the law enforcement organization,
however, has largely been overlooked. This research suggests a link between the two, where
policy has negatively impacted the evolution of law enforcement, and it further presents
misconduct as an organizational level problem.
In contemporary history, occasional flashpoint events such as the attacks on civil rights
protestors in Selma, Alabama in 1965, the Rodney King beating in 1991, or the killing of
Michael Brown in 2014, temporarily raised the profile of police misconduct and drew attention
to specific incidents, departments, and agents. Changes in access to communication means, tools,
and online platforms more recently, however, have allowed documentation and recognition of
existing police misconduct on a much wider scale. Far from being anomalous, the frequency and
dispersion of misconduct indicates that a greater, organizational force is responsible. This
problem seemed perplexing as law enforcement has undergone numerous evolutions,
professionalizing the force and moving towards a community-oriented approach. To answer the
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question of how the law enforcement organization has come into the 21st century plagued by
very similar problems as those it faced nearly half a century prior, the research had to look away
from the law enforcement apparatus itself and more closely at the policies and politics that had
the greatest influence on it.
The research identified three distinct periods of profound change in the policy and
politics of crime that directly impacted law enforcement: the “war on crime” initiated at the
height of the civil rights era in the early 1960s; the “war on drugs” of the late 1980s and early
1990s, initiated by President Nixon and codified with lasting effect by President Clinton; and, the
“war on terror” resulting from the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks. Each of these eras have
been marked by the implementation and/or expansion of a centralized, federal role in crime
control, including street crime and provocative rhetoric indicating an adversarial encounter
between opposing forces of good and evil. Lynch (2008), also identifies three distinct portrayals
of the criminal (or “penal”) subject on a comparable timeline, starting from prior to the “war on
crime” through the “war on drugs” era.
Researched findings by Boushey (2015), Surette (2007), and Scheingold (1984), all
support, to various degrees, the hypothesis that the political nature of the crime narrative has led
to disjunction between crime incidence and policy, motivating spurious policies and unfounded
public outcry while moving away from potential solutions and actual areas of concern. In the
initial, “war on crime” period, the civil rights riots had taken the public by storm, and the
Supreme Court handed down a series of rulings that found segregation unconstitutional,
enshrined due process rights for criminal defendants, and increased scrutiny of police conduct.
Resistance to these changes in the political arena, most notably in the segregationist South, was
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significant. Coupled with resistance to President Johnson’s Great Society initiatives, politicians
rebranded segregationist policies in the form of “crime control” and referred to marchers and
protestors as a threat to public safety, public property, and peace. By shifting the narrative away
from inflammatory or unpopular positions and tapping into a source of constant public concern –
crime and personal safety – lawmakers were able to extend the life (and effective range) of
discriminatory policy. This period also marked the shift of the penal subject (Lynch 2008) from a
treatment subject in need of rehabilitation, usually white and weak in stature, to a more menacing
“violent,” dark-skinned, non-white counterpart, in need of containment.
Meanwhile, the law enforcement organization was also undergoing major change, in
response to the due process revolution and findings by President Johnson’s Crime Commission
report, among other things. As the political narrative of crime was being reinvented, so did the
law enforcement organization, with an adversarial and discriminatory undertone. The new,
containment model of violent penal subject bolstered this approach driving the police and the
public further apart. The subsequent wars on drugs and terror expanded on that fundamental
notion, further systematizing and professionalizing the same flawed underpinnings, rather than
reinventing the organization with the new tools available. The war on drugs expanded federal
purview on what should have been local issues, while continuing to target particular racial and
ethnic groups, disregarding others.
The newest incarnation of the penal subject, the “Superpredator” was an even less
redeemable caricature of the previous stereotype. Evocative, war-centered political rhetoric only
validated the confrontational stance of law enforcement to the perceived threat of criminality, an
assumption supported by an infusion of military hardware and strategic assistance. Similarly, the
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war on terror expanded federal purview even further and initiated unprecedented inter-agency
cooperation between federal and local authorities, while equally targeting particular
ethnic/religious groups. This period also experienced an even more expansive deployment of
military hardware for domestic policing applications and evocation of war-centered rhetoric,
cementing law enforcement’s adversarial relationship with the public.
Identifying a number of the factors impacting law enforcement from a politics and policy
perspective has helped illuminate causes of external influence on the culture and organization of
law enforcement. However, to fully understand those factors of influence and to begin looking at
possibilities for reform it was necessary for this research to look internally, as well. Some
questions, regarding the identity, role, responsibility, and power of law enforcement were asked.
The findings indicated that law enforcement is fundamentally a public service organization and
the power extended to the state in creating it (police power) is limited to the goals and objectives
of public safety and welfare. As such, law enforcement is as much a public service fulfilling
basic logistical and infrastructural community needs as it is an armed agency of the state to
enforce laws and obstruct deviance. However, Maguire (2002) found that, as the organization
increasingly integrated quantitative crime measures in an effort to professionalize and
standardize services, it became more focused on easily quantifiable actions, almost all of which
belonged to the enforcement dimension. Supplementing the power of this drift was a political
narrative of crime friendly to it (Kraska 2007). The result was a police force that had matured
into and evolved within its enforcement role but left other aspects of its constituent, public
service identity significantly behind.
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The fault with not fully evolving a complex organ, such as law enforcement, is that it
generates many insecurities about its internal identity leading to a less receptive organization, a
more closed and internalized culture, and greater suspicion of reform, restructuring and other
means of change. Paoline et al. (2014) show that law enforcement, as with any other
organization, is receptive to improvement when internal and external conditions are available,
such as educational standards and leadership that invokes a service-oriented organizational
identity. Davis, Mateu-Gelabert and Miller’s (2005) case study of New York City precincts also
demonstrate an existing disposition to change when it is generated internally and taken seriously
within the organization. These researched methodological practices are very promising for future
policy implications, especially with regards to feasibility of reform.
The evolution of law enforcement in a manner inconsistent with its public service
mandate is a fact not lost on many observers, and some aspects of that argument have been raised
before. The increased militarization of police, confrontational relationship between law
enforcement and the public and concerns over the integrity of policy built on broad stroke data
and generalizations of threat, have all drawn criticism from experts and the public alike.
However, proponents of the current policing structure argue that how law enforcement has
developed is responsive to actual changes within society, including: 1) highly trained and armed
adversaries; 2) new categories of threat; 3) violence/resistance against law enforcement; and 4)
increasing crime. These statements are highly inaccurate characterizations of the changing social
landscape police operate within, based, at best, on erroneous statistical application. Some of
these statements hold partial truths that can and, this research argues, should elicit a vastly
different response. Indeed, there are new categories of threat, for whom police are scarcely
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prepared, and data-driven programs, for example, can be highly effective when applied
contextually – the manner with which police has evolved does not accommodate these options.
Because of the pervasive nature of some of these arguments and the potential that each provides
for positive development, it is important to look at them more specifically. Given that every
significant measurement shows crime, overall, has declined, that assumption will be excluded
from the discussion.
1) Highly trained and armed adversaries. Public access to high-powered weapons has
remained relatively steady; however, in a few cases attempts have been made to limit access to
them. Notably, President Clinton authorized the Federal Assault Weapons Ban in 1994, as a
subsection of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act (VCCLEA) to limit access to
assault weapons with large capacity magazines. A report by Koper (2004) indicates that the ban
was successful over time, with “the use of assault weapons in crime declining by more than twothirds” between the time the ban went into effect and the study (18). Koper, however, is careful
to link this development to reductions in gun violence overall, as the use of a firearm occurs in
only a small percentage of crimes overall, and the use of assault weapons is even rarer (2004,
32). Therefore, even with the relatively large reduction of two-thirds, the overall impact on gun
violence was “almost none” (Koper 2004, 32). The BJS special report on firearm violence,
reviewing use of guns during the commission of a crime over a twelve-year period (from 19932011) provides a better understanding of gun-related violence which, in total, accounts for less
than 10% of all crime (Planty and Truman 2013). Of those incidents, the report shows that
homicides accounted for merely 2% of firearm-involved incidents, with the trend in gun-related
homicides showing relative decline over a twelve-year period. An ACLU report on SWAT raids,
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whose deployment is assumed to be for high-danger incidents, shows that a weapon was found
on the scene only a third of the time, with no accurate tracking of firearm use (“The War Comes
Home” 2013). These results demonstrate that police are not confronting more dangerous or
capable adversaries by any measurable frequency, and the only trend that has emerged from the
data is one of declining, not increasing, threat.
2) New categories of threat. During the past half-century, new categories of federal crime
have emerged and been codified through legislative action. Because of the convoluted nature of
the federal criminal code and its lack of consistency in definition or categorization, a detailed
analysis of trends in criminal law creation is difficult to ascertain (O’Sullivan 2006). The sheer
number of state statutes makes surveying crime categories through state law a task beyond the
scope of this research. However, because of the political nature of crime creation, federal
legislation is a good bellwether for emergent crime categories. Inferences can be made about
such categories from a number of specific reports. At the outset, the vast majority of new crime
categories and offenses are that of new populations rather than offenses, i.e. homicide of the
elderly, assault by a habitual offender, or health care fraud (Klein and Grobey). While creating
new crimes, they are essentially the same type of offense – homicide, assault, and fraud –
committed against or by, different populations. With guidance from Albanese and Pursley (1993)
and supplemental analysis of the American Bar Association’s 1998 “Task Force on the
Federalization of Criminal Law” as well as the more updated Klein and Grobey (2012) report,
four discernible categories emerge: 1) cyber-crimes (encompassing multiple categories of
offenses that originate or are based on computer-mediated communication); 2) terrorism; 3)
environmental crimes; 4) identity theft. Environmental crimes are perpetrated by corporations
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and organizations more often than individuals, and most of which are considered regulatory
offenses, rarely involving police. Only one of these categories, terrorism, contains aspects that
constitute violent crime. Terrorism, like cyber-crime, is a broad category under which many
types of offenses fall. Therefore, it is necessary to elaborate further.
Terrorism as a crime in society and by definition in the law, has existed long before
September 11th, 2001. The term “terrorism” defined as “murder and conspiracy to commit
murder, or assault or conspiracy to commit assault”17 in the federal criminal code, has existed
since 1986. Most of the subcategories to terrorism, codified after 2001, are related to material
support of terrorist activities. In order to provide some context, the National Consortium for the
Study of Terrorism (START) published a report reviewing terrorist attacks in the United States
from 1970 (the year data was first available) to 2011, concluding that, overall, terrorist incidents
in the United States have declined, with the lowest recorded number of terrorist attacks, six,
occurring in 2006 (LaFree, Dugan and Miller 2012, 5-7). The report also highlights two
important factors that have remained consistent: incident frequency, and perpetrators (both
foreign and domestic), demonstrating that no true anomalous changes have taken place as far as
new categories of threat.
The other important aspect to assess is the process of thwarting potential threats, which
Strom, Hollywood and Pope (2015) find rests mostly on basic surveillance and investigative
work. Their research offers that “the community policing model…fits well for terrorism
prevention” citing the reliance of law enforcement on the public, friends, family, and colleagues
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of potential suspects to thwart potential attacks in a full 80% of the cases (2-3). Circumstantial
information on terror suspect arrests is not formally provided; however, a number of news
articles indicate that the apprehensions were uneventful. It should be noted that terrorism is a
federal crime and, therefore, despite local assistance, is largely coordinated and executed by
federal officials, bringing their own resources, tactics, and strategy to bear on the case. These
findings establish that terrorism, despite its recent notoriety, is neither new nor increasing, and
does not present itself as significantly divergent in terms of tackling it.
On the opposite side is cybercrime, which is equally broad in its definition and therefore
warrants some brief elaboration. Cybercrime is essentially crime committed over the internet by
aid of a computer or other web-enabled device. Jewkes and Yar (2008) differentiate between
“computer assisted” and “computer oriented” crimes, the first type having counterparts in the
real world; fraud, theft, threats, etc., while the second is consequential to the cyber network
itself; malware, viruses and hacking (4). As computers become more integrated into our lives,
more and more is accomplished over the internet creating a new access point for exploitation,
including of previously unattainable targets such as the electrical grid, or communication
satellites. The totality of the impact of cybercrime is not well measured by independent agencies
in the United States, however, Wall and Williams (2013) show that it has surpassed some
traditional crime categories in the United Kingdom (UK) for example; “Cybercrime is now the
typical high-volume property crime in the UK” (28). A report by the Global Commission on
Internet Governance also substantiates the impact of cybercrime, attributing to it millions of
dollars of losses (Jardine 2015). These crimes can be significant and have far-reaching
consequences they are also not confronted in physical space. Because the internet plays an
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important role in the construction of criminal networks and providing a marketplace for illegal
trades such as human trafficking, drugs, and money laundering, it is easy to not distinguish
between differences in “computer assisted” crimes, and those that are entirely ground-based.
The internet provides both a marketplace for deviant behavior and an unparalleled
opportunity for surveillance and capture, not afforded by ground-only crime (Jewkes and Yar
2008). Such access points to criminal enterprise provide law enforcement access to detect,
surveil, and terminate criminals and criminal enterprise, if given the resources to do so. Wall
(2008) discusses cybercrime as occurring in phases, the most recent of which having advanced to
a computer focused occurrence, targeted more towards networks/groups, rather than individuals
(117). Wall and Williams (2013) suggest that law enforcement would do well to develop
“focused” and “expertly staffed” cybercrime units as the cyber domain becomes a more fertile
space for both crime and its termination (47).
3) Violence/Resistance against law enforcement. As with new categories of threat,
violence against law enforcement has been enlisted as a major factor contributing to the need of a
more highly equipped police force and one that is adversarial in nature, given the hostile nature
of the job. This too is an erroneous conclusion. According to numbers reported by the National
Law Enforcement Officers Memorial Fund (NLEOMF), officer deaths have been steadily in
decline since 1992, reaching their lowest levels in nearly a century in 2013 (NLEOMF 2013).
UCR data collected by the FBI also shows that violence against police, whether fatal or not, has
decreased exponentially since the most recent spike in 1970. Comparing occupational safety and
risk, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) report for 2014 indicates that police work does not
make the top ten dangerous occupations. BLS statistics are taken as a percentage of the total
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workforce, meaning occupations with small work pools and high risk (loggers for example,
which ranked at the top) would occupy a higher position. To adjust for that, I examined the rate
of 11.3 per 100,000, which is only slightly more than the national average rate of occupational
risk. It is also important to clarify that a majority of occupational deaths for police officers were
“accidental” from vehicle crashes; and injury rates from stress and overexertion were about the
same as those from assault (LaTourrette, Loughran and Seabury 2008, 34-5).
None of the data supports an argument that police are facing an increasingly hostile
environment. While some specific incidents have occurred in the last year (2016) that may
impact the total numbers marginally, these changes do not reflect any long-term trends that
require, therefore, organizational change. In fact, due to popular narratives surrounding police
and the organizational persona of law enforcement, police contribute to the creation of a hostile
environment to work within by approaching the public with discontent (Scheingold 1984;
Paoline 2001; Castaneda and Ridgeway 2010).
Law enforcement is neither in greater danger nor facing more powerful threats today,
than at other points in the past. Historically, police enjoy greater occupational safety, better
protection, increased access to technology, and other means to execute their jobs effectively
today, than at almost any other time before. The analyses of innovations in crime, above, suggest
that an increasingly militarized, enforcement-focused organization for law enforcement is
profoundly mistaken. The few categories constituting new and emergent threats require computer
skills, tedious and meticulous tracing, surveillance and detective work and strong community
partnerships, not mine resistant vehicles, assault weapons, or armored personnel carriers. An
adversarial disposition actually erodes law enforcement’s strength by making it unable to
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develop meaningful partnerships with the community, whom it relies on to effectively dispose of
threats, among other duties.
Law enforcement is not missing power, personnel, or equipment. What they lack is the
proper means to apply the power they do have; the adequate training, preparation and skills to
effectively execute the full range of their responsibilities, and the appropriate tools to assist them
in completing those tasks. To do so requires a robust system capable of self-correction and
serious about unsavory topics such as oversight, responsibility, community partnership, and the
rights of the accused. These are not bywords for weakness or impotence, but essential parts of a
functioning, professional, and effective system. These topics would not even be subject to debate
if the organizational culture of law enforcement evolved to accommodate a proper definition of
their public service mandate. The politics of crime, however, have come in the way of any such
innovation. Creating a more powerful enforcement arm with military-style powers serves the
political interests of an increasingly powerful state, rather than public interest. Lack of oversight
or accountability allows the state to act with impunity and a military-style enforcement arm can
ensure compliance and deter dissent. These manifestations are expressly not the purpose of
police power, however, which is theoretically invalidated once its exercise is no longer in the
public interest. Centralization of crime and crime control has made the former more of a reality.
The argument against centralization is not one that is against consistency or
standardization when it comes to applying the rule of law or the availability of resources to law
enforcement. It is, however, a repudiation of the idea that a highly contextual event such as crime
can be generalized to match a one-size-fits-all solution. This statement has been validated
throughout this research. Even if we were to accept the crime wave typology, the vast diversity
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of communities in the United States and particularly the numerousness of small locales in
comparison to large ones, means that aggregate data is skewed to disproportionately represent
changes in a handful of urban centers that, despite their size, do not tell the story of American
crime. A wave of property crime in St. Louis could be a wave of gang violence in Los Angeles,
or of homicides in New York City – the causes and, therefore, responses are not congruent. That
is to say nothing of the fact that none of these are necessarily reflective of the story of Tupelo,
MS, Missoula, MT, or Walla Walla, WA.
Centralization often means, however, that when Los Angeles’ gang problem calls for
tactical gear, Tupelo, MS will find themselves preparing for a riot that will never happen. More
importantly, individual agencies are pigeon-holed into certain expansions based on the budgetary
opportunities offered to incentivize programs developed on these same aggregate measurements.
That is the story of the 1033 program and its predecessor. Rather than trying to centralize and
federalize the response, what can and should be centralized is the toolkit available to law
enforcement: the resources, ethics, standards, requirements, skills, and training programs that
properly prepare police for their occupational requirements. What tool each officer draws for the
given situation is a decision that officer must make given the circumstance, and it is one that
he/she should be availed to make with informed judgement.
Impacting the political nature of crime policy and/or altering the narrative of crime is an
immense task that is beyond the scope of this paper; however, this research points to some
possible points of reform that are more feasible in the short run. Four specific recommendations
emerge from this research, based on the informative and detailed work of Maguire (2003);
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Fielding and Innes (2007); Paoline et al. (2014); Kraska (2009); DeMichelle and Kraska (2007);
and Castaneda and Ridgeway (2010):
1. Reworking how law enforcement quantifies institutional effectiveness;
2. Building up current professional institutions to form a robust professional licensure
and accreditation body;
3. Creating minimum education and training standards that apply to all law enforcement
agencies and include disciplinary immersion beyond tactical preparedness;
4. Diverting current budget allocations to increase officer pay and provide for
infrastructural development, particularly in smaller police and sheriffs offices.
A law enforcement organization empowered to reform from within, and unafraid to hold itself
accountable, will be better capable of evolving and improving its own field while encouraging its
members to take a proactive role in doing so themselves. Such changes would undoubtedly
impact the organizational culture of law enforcement, challenging or, perhaps ambitiously,
balancing out the influence of politically charged crime control.
Crime is an issue deserving attention and addressing it properly is undoubtedly of
importance. Doing so effectively, however, must be with due accord given to all supporting
factors and distinct from political ideologies. While crime cannot be eliminated, recognizing
failed practices and the reasons why they failed is at least a step in the right direction. A robust
and well integrated police force is in the interest of all members of a properly functioning
society, and it should be a public priority to ensure that such an organization exists. A properly
functioning police force not only protects the public, but encourages their active participation in
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the success of law enforcement. That requires a level of accountability commensurate with its
power. The extraordinary power to take life and liberty must be kept in check by no less than an
extraordinary sense of responsibility in the judgement process. Developing these ethics in
individual agencies and agents cannot be successful without it first being demonstrated by the
broader organization through concrete measures.
Therefore, improving the relationship between law enforcement and the public is well
within reach, and minimizing impropriety within the organization is possible as soon as these
issues are recognized. While this research helps clarify the influence of crime policy on the law
enforcement organization and suggests some possibilities for reform, others remain to be
explored. A close analysis of outcomes between police agencies in different contexts (such as on
college campuses) can shed some light on how differences in narratives of criminality can impact
enforcement activities. More comprehensive research on IACP membership and the role of
higher-order police participation in disciplinary activities, could also help inform future
organizational innovations.
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